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Abstract
The present paper proposes a novel way to unify Rough Set Theory and Formal Concept Analysis. Our
method stems from results and insights developed in the algebraic theory of modal logic, and is based on
the idea that Pawlak’s original approximation spaces can be seen as special instances of enriched formal
contexts, i.e. relational structures based on formal contexts from Formal Concept Analysis.
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1 Introduction
Rough Set Theory (RST) [63] and Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) [34] are very influential foundational
theories in information science, and the issues of comparing [80, 52], combining [71, 72, 44], and unifying
[46, 77, 8] them have received considerable attention in the literature (see [45] for a very comprehensive
overview of the literature), also very recently [7, 81, 70, 83, 47, 31, 3, 42, 56].
The present paper proposes a novel way to unify RST and FCA. Our method stems from results and
insights developed in the algebraic theory of modal logic, and is based on the idea that Pawlak’s original
approximation spaces can be seen as special instances of enriched formal contexts (cf. Definition 3, see
[17, 13]), i.e. relational structures based on formal contexts from FCA. Mathematically, this is realized in an
embedding of the class AS of approximation spaces into the class EFC of enriched formal contexts which—
building on Drew Moshier’s category-theoretic perspective and results on formal contexts [57]—makes the
following diagram commute:
ASS5-BAO+
EFCCML
In the above diagram, the lowermost horizontal arrow assigns each approximation space X = (S,R) (seen
as a Kripke frame for the modal logic S5) to its associated complex algebra X+ = (P(S),〈R〉, [R]), which
belongs in the class S5-BAO+ of perfect S5 modal algebras (aka perfect S5 Boolean Algebras with Operator),
the uppermost horizontal arrow assigns each enriched formal context F = (P,R^,R) (cf. Definition 3) to
its associated complex algebra F+ = (P+,〈R^〉, [R]), which belongs in the class CML of complete modal
lattices, and the leftmost vertical arrow is the natural embedding of perfect S5 modal algebras into complete
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modal lattices. This mathematical environment provides the background and motivation for the introduction
of conceptual (co-)approximation spaces (cf. Definitions 8 and 9) as suitable structures supporting rough
concepts in the same way in which approximation spaces support rough sets, i.e., via suitable relations.
As a consequence of this generalization, we obtain a novel and different set of possible interpretations for
the language of the lattice-based normal modal logic discussed in [17, 13]: just as S5 is motivated both as
an epistemic logic and as the logic of rough sets, the logic introduced in [13] can be understood both as an
epistemic logic of categories and as the logic of rough concepts.
Structure of the paper. In Section 2, we collect preliminaries on approximation spaces with their asso-
ciated complex algebras and modal logic, and enriched formal contexts, also with their associated complex
algebras and modal logic. In Section 3, we partly recall and partly develop the background theory motivating
the embedding of approximation spaces into a suitable subclass of enriched formal contexts, and show that
this embedding makes the diagram above commute. On the basis of these facts, in Section 4 we introduce
conceptual (co-)approximation spaces, and prove that these structures are logically captured by a certain
modal axiomatization. In Section 5, we discuss how conceptual (co-)approximation spaces can be used to
model a wide variety of situations which, in their turn, allow for different interpretations of the modal op-
erators arising from them. In Section 6, we introduce varieties of lattice-based modal algebras that capture
abstract versions of the complex algebras of conceptual (co-)approximation spaces, and which provide al-
gebraic semantics to the modal logics of conceptual (co-)approximation spaces. In Section 7, we apply the
insights and constructions developed in the previous sections to extend and generalize three different (and
independently developed) logical frameworks which aim at address and account for vagueness, gradedness,
and uncertainty. We present conclusions and directions for further research in Section 8.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, the superscript (·)c denotes the relative complement of the subset of a given set. In
particular, for any binary relation R ⊆ S× S, we let Rc ⊆ S× S be defined by (s,s′) ∈ Rc iff (s,s′) < R. For
any such R and any Z ⊆ S, we also let R[Z] := {s ∈ S | (z,s) ∈ R for some z ∈ Z} and R−1[Z] := {s ∈ S |
(s,z) ∈ R for some z ∈ Z}. As usual, we write R[z] and R−1[z] instead of R[{z}] and R−1[{z}], respectively.
The relation R can be associated with the following semantic modal operators: for any Z ⊆ S,
〈R〉Z := R−1[Z] = {s ∈ S | (s,z) ∈ R for some z ∈ Z}, (1)
[R]Z := (R−1[Zc])c = {s ∈ S | if (s,z) ∈ R then z ∈ Z}, (2)
and also with the following ones:
[R〉Z := (R−1[Z])c = {s ∈ S | if (s,z) ∈ R then z < Z}, (3)
〈R]Z := R−1[Zc] = {s ∈ S | (s,z) ∈ R for some z < Z}. (4)
As is well known, in the context of approximation spaces, where R is an equivalence relation encoding
indistinguishability, the sets [R]Z,〈R〉Z, [R〉Z, and 〈R]Z collect the elements of S that are definitely in Z,
possibly in Z, definitely not in Z, and possibly not in Z. All these operations are interdefinable using relative
complementation, just like their syntactic counterparts are interdefinable using Boolean negation. However,
since in the setting of formal contexts this will no longer be the case, we find it useful to introduce this
notation already in the classical setting.
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2.1 Approximation spaces, their complex algebras and modal logic
Approximation spaces are structuresX= (S,R) such that S is a set, and R⊆ S×S is an equivalence relation.1
For any such X and any Z ⊆ S, the upper and lower approximations of Z are respectively defined as follows:
Z :=
⋃
{R[z] | z ∈ Z} and Z :=
⋃
{R[z] | z ∈ Z and R[z]⊆ Z}.
A rough set of X is a pair (Z,Z) for any Z ⊆ S (cf. [1]). Since approximation spaces coincide with Kripke
frames for the modal logic S5, notions and insights from the semantic theory of modal logic have been
imported to rough set theory (cf. [59, 1, 60]). In particular, the complex algebra of an approximation space X
(and more in general of a Kripke frame) is the Boolean algebra with operator
X+ := (P(S),∩,∪,(·)c,S,∅,〈R〉, [R]),
where 〈R〉 and [R] are defined as in (1) and (2). Moreover, since R is an equivalence relation, it is not difficult
to verify that
Z = 〈R〉Z and Z = [R]Z,
with 〈R〉 and [R] validating the axioms of the classical normal modal logic S5, which is the axiomatic exten-
sion of the basic normal modal logic K with the following axioms, respectively corresponding to reflexivity,
transitivity and symmetry.
ϕ → ϕ ϕ → ϕ ϕ → ^ϕ .
Hence, X+ is an S5-algebra. Given a language for S5 over a set Prop of proposition variables, a model
is a tuple M = (X,V ) where X = (S,R) is a Kripke frame, and V : Prop → X+ on X is a valuation. The
satisfaction M,w  ϕ of any formula ϕ at states w in M, and its extension [[ϕ ]] := {w ∈ S |M,w  ϕ} are
defined recursively as follows:
M,w  p iff w ∈V (p) [[p]] =V (p)
M,w  ϕ ∨ψ iff w ∈ [[ϕ ]] or w ∈ [[ψ ]] [[ϕ ∨ψ ]] = [[ϕ ]]∪ [[ψ ]]
M,w  ϕ ∧ψ iff w ∈ [[ϕ ]] and w ∈ [[ψ ]] [[ϕ ∧ψ ]] = [[ϕ ]]∩ [[ψ ]]
M,w  ¬ϕ iff w < [[ϕ ]] [[¬ϕ ]] = [[ϕ ]]c
M,w  ϕ iff wRu implies u ∈ [[ϕ ]] [[ϕ]] = [R][[ϕ ]]
M,w  ^ϕ iff wRu for some u ∈ [[ϕ ]] [[^ϕ ]] = 〈R〉[[ϕ ]]
Finally, as to the interpretation of sequents:
M |= ϕ ⊢ ψ iff for all w ∈W , ifM,w  ϕ , thenM,w  ψ
A sequent ϕ ⊢ ψ is valid on a Kripke frame X (in symbols: X |= ϕ ⊢ ψ) if M |= ϕ ⊢ ψ for every modelM
based on X.
2.2 Rough algebras
In this subsection, we report on the definitions of several classes of algebras, collectively referred to as ‘rough
algebras’, which have been introduced and studied as abstract versions of approximation spaces (cf. e.g. [1,
43, 10, 67, 68]).
Definition 1. [67] An algebraT=(L,¬, I) is a topological quasi-Boolean algebra (tqBa) if L=(L,∧,∨,⊤,⊥)
is a bounded distributive lattice, and for all a,b ∈ L,
1Approximation spaces form a subclass of Kripke frames, which are structures X = (S,R) such that S is a set and R ⊆ S× S is an
arbitrary relation.
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T1. ¬¬a= a T2. ¬(a∨b) = ¬a∧¬b
T3. I(a∧b) = Ia∧ Ib T4. IIa= Ia
T5. Ia≤ a T6. I⊤=⊤
A tqBa T as above is a topological quasi-Boolean algebra 5 (tqBa5) if for all a ∈ L,
T8. CIa= Ia, where Ca := ¬I¬a.
A tqBa5 T is an intermediate algebra of type 1 (IA1) iff for all a ∈ L,
T9. Ia∨¬Ia=⊤.
A tqBa5 T is an intermediate algebra of type 2 (IA2) iff for all a ∈ L,
T10. Ia∨ Ib= I(a∨b).
A tqBa5 T is an intermediate algebra of type 3 (IA3) iff for all a ∈ L,
T11. Ia≤ Ib and Ca≤Cb imply a≤ b.
A pre-rough algebra is a tqBa5 T which satisfies T9, T10 and T11. A rough algebra is a complete and
completely distributive pre-rough algebra.
2.3 Formal contexts and their concept lattices
This subsection elaborates and expands on [13, Appendix] and [17]. For any relation T ⊆U ×V , and any
U ′ ⊆U and V ′ ⊆V , let
T (1)[U ′] := {v | ∀u(u ∈U ′⇒ uTv)} T (0)[V ′] := {u | ∀v(v ∈V ′ ⇒ uTv)}. (5)
Well known properties of this construction (cf. [26, Sections 7.22-7.29]) are stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. 1. X1 ⊆ X2 ⊆U implies T
(1)[X2]⊆ T
(1)[X1], and Y1 ⊆ Y2 ⊆V implies T
(0)[Y2]⊆ T
(0)[Y1].
2. U ′ ⊆ T (0)[V ′] iff V ′ ⊆ T (1)[U ′].
3. U ′ ⊆ T (0)[T (1)[U ′]] and V ′ ⊆ T (1)[T (0)[V ′]].
4. T (1)[U ′] = T (1)[T (0)[T (1)[U ′]]] and T (0)[V ′] = T (0)[T (1)[T (0)[V ′]]].
5. T (0)[
⋃
V ] =
⋂
V ′∈V T
(0)[V ′] and T (1)[
⋃
U ] =
⋂
U ′∈U T
(1)[U ′].
In what follows, we fix two sets A and X , and use a,b (resp. x,y) for elements of A (resp. X), and B,C,A j
(resp. Y,W,X j) for subsets of A (resp. of X) throughout this section. Formal contexts, or polarities, are
structures P = (A,X , I) such that A and X are sets, and I ⊆ A×X is a binary relation. Intuitively, formal
contexts can be understood as abstract representations of databases [34], so that A represents a collection of
objects, X as a collection of features, and for any object a and feature x, the tuple (a,x) belongs to I exactly
when object a has feature x.
As is well known, for every formal context P= (A,X , I), the pair of maps
(·)↑ : P(A)→P(X) and (·)↓ : P(X)→P(A),
respectively defined by the assignments B↑ := I(1)[B] andY ↓ := I(0)[Y ], form a Galois connection (cf. Lemma
1.2), and hence induce the closure operators (·)↑↓ and (·)↓↑ on P(A) and on P(X) respectively.2 Moreover,
the fixed points of these closure operators (sometimes referred to as Galois-stable sets) form complete sub-⋂
-semilattices of P(A) and P(X) (and hence complete lattices) respectively, which are dually isomorphic
to each other via the restrictions of the maps (·)↑ and (·)↓ (cf. Lemma 1.3). This motivates the following
2When B= {a} (resp. Y = {x}) we write a↑↓ for {a}↑↓ (resp. x↓↑ for {x}↓↑).
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Definition 2. For every formal context P = (A,X , I), a formal concept of P is a pair c = (B,Y ) such that
B⊆ A, Y ⊆ X, and B↑ = Y and Y ↓ = B. The set B is the extension of c, which we will sometimes denote [[c]],
and Y is the intension of c, sometimes denoted ([c]). Let L(P) denote the set of the formal concepts of P. Then
the concept lattice of P is the complete lattice
P+ := (L(P),
∧
,
∨
),
where for every X ⊆ L(P),
∧
X := (
⋂
c∈X
[[c]],(
⋂
c∈X
[[c]])↑) and
∨
X := ((
⋂
c∈X
([c]))↓,
⋂
c∈X
([c])).
Then clearly, ⊤P
+
:=
∧
∅= (A,A↑) and ⊥P
+
:=
∨
∅= (X↓,X), and the partial order underlying this lattice
structure is defined as follows: for any c,d ∈ L(P),
c≤ d iff [[c]]⊆ [[d]] iff ([d])⊆ ([c]).
Theorem 1. (Birkhoff’s theorem, main theorem of FCA) Any complete lattice L is isomorphic to the concept
lattice P+ of some formal context P.
Proof. If L= (L,≤) is a complete lattice seen as a poset, then L  P+ e.g. for P := (L,L,≤). 
2.4 Enriched formal contexts and their complex algebras
In [13], structures similar to the following are introduced as generalizations of Kripke frames.
Definition 3. An enriched formal context is a tuple
F= (P,R,R^)
such that P = (A,X , I) is a formal context, and R ⊆ A×X and R^ ⊆ X ×A are I-compatible relations, that
is, R
(0)

[x] (resp. R
(0)
^
[a]) and R
(1)

[a] (resp. R
(1)
^
[x]) are Galois-stable for all x ∈ X and a ∈ A. The complex
algebra of F is
F+ = (P+, [R],〈R^〉),
where P+ is the concept lattice of P, and [R] and 〈R^〉 are unary operations on P
+ defined as follows: for
every c ∈ P+,
[R]c := (R
(0)

[([c])],(R
(0)

[([c])])↑) and 〈R^〉c := ((R
(0)
^
[[[c]]])↓,R
(0)
^
[[[c]]]).
The following lemma provides equivalent reformulations of the notion of I-compatibility and refines [13,
Lemmas 3 and 4].
Lemma 2. 1. The following are equivalent for every formal context P= (A,X , I) and every relation R⊆
A×X:
(i) R(0)[x] is Galois-stable for every x ∈ X;
(ii) R(0)[Y ] is Galois-stable for every Y ⊆ X;
(iii) R(1)[B] = R(1)[B↑↓] for every B⊆ A.
2. The following are equivalent for every formal context P= (A,X , I) and every relation R⊆ A×X:
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(i) R(1)[a] is Galois-stable for every a ∈ A;
(ii) R(1)[B] is Galois-stable, for every B⊆ A;
(iii) R(0)[Y ] = R(0)[Y ↓↑] for every Y ⊆ X.
Proof. We only prove item 1, the proof of item 2 being similar. For (i)⇒ (ii), since Y =
⋃
x∈Y{x}, Lemma
1.5 implies that R(0)[Y ] = R(0)[
⋃
x∈Y{x}] =
⋂
x∈Y R
(0)[x] which is Galois-stable by (i) and the fact that Galois-
stable sets are closed under arbitrary intersections. The converse direction is immediate.
(i)⇒ (iii). Since (·)↑↓ is a closure operator, B⊆ B↑↓. Hence, Lemma 1.1 implies that R
(1)

[B↑↓]⊆ R
(1)

[B].
For the converse inclusion, let x ∈ R
(1)

[B]. By Lemma 1.2, this is equivalent to B⊆ R
(0)

[x]. Since R
(0)

[x] is
Galois-stable by assumption, this implies that B↑↓ ⊆ R
(0)
 [x], i.e., again by Lemma 1.2, x ∈ R
(1)
 [B
↑↓]. This
shows that R
(1)

[B]⊆ R
(1)

[B↑↓], as required.
(iii)⇒ (i). Let x ∈ X . It is enough to show that (R
(0)

[x])↑↓ ⊆ R
(0)

[x]. By Lemma 1.2, R
(0)

[x] ⊆ R
(0)

[x]
is equivalent to x ∈ R
(1)

[R
(0)

[x]]. By assumption, R
(1)

[R
(0)

[x]] = R
(1)

[(R
(0)

[x])↑↓], hence x ∈ R
(1)

[(R
(0)

[x])↑↓].
Again by Lemma 1.2, this is equivalent to (R
(0)

[x])↑↓ ⊆ R
(0)

[x], as required. 
For any enriched formal context F, let us define R_ ⊆ X×A by xR_a iff aRx, and R ⊆ A×X by aRx
iff xR^a. Hence, for every B⊆ A and Y ⊆ X ,
R
(0)
_ [B] = R
(1)

[B] R
(1)
_ [Y ] = R
(0)

[Y ] R
(0)

[Y ] = R
(1)
^ [Y ] R
(1)

[B] = R
(0)
^ [B]. (6)
By Lemma 2, the I-compatibility of R and R^ guarantees that R
(0)

[Y ] and R
(0)

[Y ] are Galois-stable sets for
every Y ⊆ X , and that R
(0)
^ [B] and R
(0)
_ [B] are Galois-stable sets for every B⊆ A, and hence implies that the
maps [R],〈R^〉, [R],〈R_〉 : P
+ → P+ are well-defined. However, I-compatibility is strictly stronger than the
maps [R],〈R^〉, [R],〈R_〉 being well-defined, as is shown in the following example.
Example 1. Let P=(A,X , I)with A= {a,b,c}, X = {x,y,z} and I= {(a,y),(a,z)}. Let R= {(a,y),(a,z),(b,x)}.
a b c
x y z
P P+
(A,∅)
({a},{y,z})
(∅,X)
The concept lattice of P is represented in the picture above. It is easy to verify that R(0)[X ] = ∅,
R(0)[{y,z}] = {a} and R(0)[∅] = A, hence [R] : P+ → P+ is well defined and is the identity on P+. Likewise,
R(1)[A] = ∅, R(1)[{a}] = {y,z} and R(1)[∅] = X, hence 〈R−1〉 : P+ → P+ is well defined and is the identity on
P+. However, R is not I-compatible. Indeed, R(0)[x] = {b} and R(1)[b] = {x} are not Galois-stable.
Lemma 3. For any enriched formal context F = (A,X , I,R,R^), the algebra F
+ = (P+, [R],〈R^〉) is a
complete normal lattice expansion such that [R] is completely meet-preserving and 〈R^〉 is completely join-
preserving.
Proof. As discussed above, the I-compatibility of R and R^ guarantees that the maps [R],〈R^〉, [R],〈R_〉 :
P+ → P+ are well defined. Since P+ is a complete lattice, by [26, Proposition 7.31], to show that [R] is
completely meet-preserving and 〈R^〉 is completely join-preserving, it is enough to show that 〈R_〉 is the left
adjoint of [R] and that [R] is the right adjoint of 〈R^〉. For any c,d ∈ P
+,
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〈R_〉c≤ d iff ([d])⊆ R
(0)
_
[[[c]]] ordering of concepts
iff ([d])⊆ R
(1)

[[[c]]] (6)
iff [[c]]⊆ R
(0)

[([d])] Lemma 1.2
iff c≤ [R]d. ordering of concepts
Likewise, one shows that [R] is the right adjoint of 〈R^〉. 
2.5 Basic modal logic of concepts and its enriched formal context semantics
In [17], following the general methodology for interpreting normal lattice-based logics on polarity-based
(i.e. formal-context-based) relational structures discussed in [15], a lattice-based normal modal logic is in-
troduced as the basic epistemic logic of categories, together with its semantics based on a restricted class of
formal contexts. The restrictions were lifted in [13]. In what follows we report on a variation of this logic,
and the semantics proposed in [13].
Basic logic and informal understanding. Let Prop be a (countable or finite) set of atomic propositions.
The language L of the basic modal logic of formal concepts is
ϕ :=⊥ | ⊤ | p | ϕ ∧ϕ | ϕ ∨ϕ | ϕ |^ϕ
where p∈Prop. Clearly, the logical signature of this languagematches the algebraic signature of the complex
algebra of any enriched formal context F = (P,R,R^) (cf. Definition 3). Hence, formulas in this language
can be interpreted as formal concepts of F. If the formal context P on which F is based is regarded as the
abstract representation of a database, atomic propositions p ∈ Prop can be understood as atomic labels (or
names) for concepts, appropriate to the nature of the database. For instance, if the database consists of music
albums and their features (e.g. names of performers, types of musical instruments, number of bits per minute
etc), then the atomic propositions can stand for names of music genres (e.g. jazz, rock, rap); likewise, if
the database consists of movies and their features (e.g. names of directors or performers, duration, presence
of special effects, presence of costumes, presence of shooting scenes, etc), then the atomic propositions can
stand for movie genres (e.g. western, drama, horror); if the database consists of goods on sale in a supermarket
and their features (e.g. capacity of packages, presence of additives, presence of organic certification, etc) then
the conceptual labels can stand for supermarket categories (e.g. detergents, dairies, spices); if the database
consists of the patients in a hospital and their symptoms (e.g. fever, jaundice, vertigos, etc), then the atomic
propositions can stand for diseases (e.g. pneumonia, hepatitis, diabetes). Compound formulas ϕ ∧ψ and
ϕ ∨ψ respectively denote the greatest common subconcept and the smallest common superconcept of ϕ
and ψ . In [17, 13], modal operators are given an epistemic interpretation, so that, for a given agent i ∈ Ag,
the formula iϕ was understood as “the category ϕ , according to agent i”, but in the present paper we will
propose different (although possibly related) interpretations (cf. Section 7). The basic, or minimal normal
L -logic is a set L of sequents ϕ ⊢ ψ (which intuitively read “ϕ is a subconcept of ψ”) with ϕ ,ψ ∈ L ,
containing the following axioms:
• Sequents for propositional connectives:
p ⊢ p, ⊥ ⊢ p, p ⊢ ⊤,
p ⊢ p∨q, q ⊢ p∨q, p∧q ⊢ p, p∧q ⊢ q,
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• Sequents for modal operators:
⊤ ⊢ ⊤ p∧q ⊢ (p∧q)
^⊥ ⊢⊥ ^p∨^q ⊢ ^(p∨q)
and closed under the following inference rules:
ϕ ⊢ χ χ ⊢ ψ
ϕ ⊢ ψ
ϕ ⊢ ψ
ϕ (χ/p) ⊢ ψ (χ/p)
χ ⊢ ϕ χ ⊢ ψ
χ ⊢ ϕ ∧ψ
ϕ ⊢ χ ψ ⊢ χ
ϕ ∨ψ ⊢ χ
ϕ ⊢ ψ
ϕ ⊢ ψ
ϕ ⊢ ψ
^ϕ ⊢ ^ψ
By an L -logic we understand any extension of L with L -axioms ϕ ⊢ ψ .
Interpretation in enriched formal contexts. For any enriched formal context F= (P,R,R^), a valuation
on F is a map V : Prop → P+. For every conceptual label p ∈ Prop, we let [[p]] := [[V (p)]] (resp. ([p]) :=
([V (p)])) denote the extension (resp. the intension) of the interpretation of p under V . The elements of [[p]]
are the members of concept p underV ; the elements of ([p]) describe concept p underV . Any valuationV on
F extends homomorphically to an interpretation map of L -formulas defined as follows:
V (p) = ([[p]],([p]))
V (⊤) = (A,A↑)
V (⊥) = (X↓,X)
V (ϕ ∧ψ) = ([[ϕ ]]∩ [[ψ ]],([[ϕ ]]∩ [[ψ ]])↑)
V (ϕ ∨ψ) = ((([ϕ ])∩ ([ψ ]))↓,([ϕ ])∩ ([ψ ]))
V (ϕ) = (R
(0)

[([ϕ ])],(R
(0)

[([ϕ ])])↑)
V (^ϕ) = ((R
(0)
^
[[[ϕ ]]])↓,R
(0)
^
[[[ϕ ]]]).
A model is a tupleM= (F,V ) where F= (P,R,R^) is an enriched formal context andV is a valuation on F.
For every ϕ ∈L , we write:
M,a  ϕ iff a ∈ [[ϕ ]]M
M,x≻ ϕ iff x ∈ ([ϕ ])M
and we readM,a  ϕ as “a is a member of category ϕ”, andM,x≻ ϕ as “x describes category ϕ”. Spelling
out the definition above, we can equivalently rewrite it in the following recursive form:
M,a  p iff a ∈ [[p]]M
M,x≻ p iff x ∈ ([p])M
M,a ⊤ always
M,x≻⊤ iff aIx for all a ∈ A
M,x≻⊥ always
M,a ⊥ iff aIx for all x ∈ X
M,a  ϕ ∧ψ iff M,a  ϕ andM,a  ψ
M,x≻ ϕ ∧ψ iff for all a ∈ A, ifM,a  ϕ ∧ψ , then aIx
M,x≻ ϕ ∨ψ iff M,x≻ ϕ andM,x≻ ψ
M,a  ϕ ∨ψ iff for all x ∈ X , ifM,x≻ ϕ ∨ψ , then aIx
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Hence, in each model, ⊤ is interpreted as the concept generated by the set A of all objects, i.e. the widest
concept and hence the one with the laxest (possibly empty) description; ⊥ is interpreted as the category
generated by the set X of all features, i.e. the smallest category and hence the one with the most restrictive
description and possibly empty extension; ϕ ∧ψ is interpreted as the semantic category determined by the
intersection of the extensions of ϕ and ψ (hence, the description of ϕ ∧ψ certainly includes ([ϕ ])∪ ([ψ ]) but
is possibly larger). Likewise, ϕ ∨ψ is interpreted as the semantic category determined by the intersection
of the intensions of ϕ and ψ (hence, [[ϕ ]]∪ [[ψ ]] ⊆ [[ϕ ∨ψ ]] but this inclusion is typically strict). As to the
interpretation of modal formulas:
M,a  ϕ iff for all x ∈ X , ifM,x≻ ϕ , then aRx
M,x≻ ϕ iff for all a ∈ A, ifM,a  ϕ , then aIx.
M,a  ^ϕ iff for all x ∈ X , ifM,x≻ ^ϕ , then aIx
M,x≻ ^ϕ iff for all a ∈ A, ifM,a  ϕ , then xR^a.
Thus, in each model, ϕ is interpreted as the concept whose members are those objects which are R-related
to every feature in the description of ϕ , and ^ϕ is interpreted as the category described by those features
which are R^-related to every member of ϕ . Finally, as to the interpretation of sequents:
M |= ϕ ⊢ ψ iff for all a ∈ A, ifM,a  ϕ , thenM,a  ψ
iff for all x ∈ X , ifM,x≻ ψ , thenM,x≻ ϕ .
A sequent ϕ ⊢ ψ is valid on an enriched formal context F (in symbols: F |= ϕ ⊢ ψ) if M |= ϕ ⊢ ψ for
every model M based on F. As discussed in [15, Section 2], the basic logic of formal concepts is complete
w.r.t. its associated class of enriched formal contexts defined as in Definition 3.
In conclusion, from a purely logical and algebraic perspective, it is clear that, since its propositional base
is the logic of general lattices, the basic normal logic of formal concepts is more general, i.e. weaker, than
the basic classical normal modal logic, and hence the class of algebras for the latter is a proper subclass of
the class of algebras for the former. In Section 3, we will show that the class of relational models of the latter
can also be embedded in the class of relational models of the former so as to preserve the natural embedding
of the corresponding classes of algebras, and make the diagram discussed in Section 1 commute.
2.6 Axiomatic extensions and modal expansions
Axiomatic extensions. The basic normal modal logic of formal concepts and its semantics based on en-
riched formal contexts provide the background environment for the systematic study of several well known
modal principles such as p ⊢ p, p ⊢^p, ^^p ⊢ p, p ⊢ p ^p ⊢ ^p. The theory of unified correspon-
dence [20, 22, 15, 14, 16] guarantees that the validity on any given enriched formal context of each of these
and other modal principles is equivalent to a first-order condition being true of the given enriched formal
context, just in the same way in which the validity of e.g. p ⊢ p on a given Kripke frame corresponds to that
Kripke frame being reflexive, and so on. In the present paper, we will restrict our attention to certain modal
principles which are relevant to the development of the theory of rough concepts, and we will address their
study from two different perspectives; the first one concerns lifting the first order condition which classically
corresponds to the given modal principle from Kripke frames to enriched formal context. The second per-
spective concerns the autonomous interpretation of the first order correspondents of the modal principles on
enriched formal contexts. More on this in the next sections.
Expanding with negative modalities. In some situations (cf. Sections 5.7 and 5.8, see also discussions in
[51, Section 5]), it can be useful to work with a more expressive language such as the following one:
ϕ :=⊥ | ⊤ | p | ϕ ∧ϕ | ϕ ∨ϕ | ϕ |^ϕ | ⊲ϕ | ⊳ϕ ,
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the additional connectives ⊲ and ⊳ are characterized by the following axioms and rules:
⊤ ⊢ ⊲⊥ ⊲p∧⊲q ⊢ ⊲(p∨q)
⊳⊤ ⊢⊥ ⊳(p∧q) ⊢ ⊳p∨⊳q
ϕ ⊢ ψ
⊲ψ ⊢ ⊲ϕ
ϕ ⊢ ψ
⊳ψ ⊢ ⊳ϕ
By the general theory [15, 37, 23], enriched formal contexts for this expanded language are tuples F =
(P,R,R^,R⊲,R⊳) such that (P,R,R^) is as in Definition 3, and R⊲⊆A×A and R⊳⊆X×X are I-compatible
relations, that is, R
(0)
⊲
[b] (resp. R
(0)
⊳
[y]) and R
(1)
⊲
[a] (resp. R
(1)
⊳
[x]) are Galois-stable for all x,y ∈ X and a,b∈ A.
The complex algebra of such an F is
F+ = (P+, [R],〈R^〉, [R⊲〉,〈R⊳]),
where (P+, [R],〈R^〉) is as in Definition 3, and [R⊲〉 and 〈R⊳] are unary operations on P
+ defined as follows:
for every c ∈ P+,
[R⊲〉c := (R
(0)
⊲
[[[c]]],(R
(0)
⊲
[[[c]]])↑) and 〈R⊳]c := ((R
(0)
⊳
[([c])])↓,R
(0)
⊳
[([c])]).
Valuations and models for this expanded language are defined analogously as indicated above, and for
each such modelM,
M,a  ⊲ϕ iff for all b ∈ A, ifM,b  ϕ , then aR⊲b
M,x≻ ⊲ϕ iff for all a ∈ A, ifM,a  ⊲ϕ , then aIx.
M,a  ⊳ϕ iff for all x ∈ X , ifM,x≻ ⊳ϕ , then aIx
M,x≻ ⊳ϕ iff for all y ∈ X , ifM,y≻ ϕ , then xR⊳y.
Thus, in each model, ⊲ϕ is interpreted as the concept whose members are those objects which are R⊲-related
to every member of ϕ , and ⊳ϕ is interpreted as the concept described by those features which are R⊳-related
to every feature describing ϕ . For every enriched formal context F= (P,R,R^,R⊲,R⊳), any valuation V on
F extends to an interpretation map of formulas defined as above for formulas in the L -fragment, and for ⊲-
and ⊳-formulas is defined as follows:
V (⊲ϕ) = (R
(0)
⊲
[[[ϕ ]]],(R
(0)
⊲
[[[ϕ ]]])↑)
V (⊳ϕ) = ((R
(0)
⊳
[([ϕ ])])↓,R
(0)
⊳
[([ϕ ])])
3 Approximation spaces as enriched formal contexts
In the present section, we discuss how to represent any given approximation space X as an enriched formal
context FX so that the complex algebra F
+
X coincides with X
+, i.e., so that the diagram of Section 1 com-
mutes. The requirement that this representation preserves the algebra arising from each approximation space
guarantees that the representation preserves the logical properties of X that can be expressed in the language
of Section 2.5. We start addressing this question for sets and formal contexts. We will also discuss the same
question for Kripke frames and enriched formal contexts.
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3.1 Lifting relations
Throughout this section, for every set S, we let ∆S := {(s,s) | s ∈ S}, and we typically drop the subscript when
it does not cause ambiguities. Hence we write e.g. ∆c = {(s,s′) | s,s′ ∈ S and s , s′}. We let SA and SX be
copies of S, and for every P⊆ S, we let PA ⊆ SA and PX ⊆ SX denote the corresponding copies of P in SA and
SX , respectively. Then P
c
X (resp. P
c
A) stands both for (P
c)X (resp. (P
c)A) and (PX)
c (resp. (PA)
c). For the sake
of a more manageable notation, we will use a and b (resp. x and y) to indicate both elements of A (resp. X)
and their corresponding elements in SA (resp. SX ), relying on the types of the relations for disambiguation.
Definition 4. For every R⊆ S× S, we let
1. IR ⊆ SA× SX such that aIRx iff aRx;
2. JR ⊆ SX × SA such that xJRa iff xRa;
3. HR ⊆ SA× SA such that aHRb iff aRb;
4. KR ⊆ SX × SX such that xKRy iff xRy.
Lemma 4. For every R⊆ S× S,
(JR)
−1 = IR−1 (IR)
−1 = JR−1 (HR)
−1 = HR−1 (KR)
−1 = KR−1 . (7)
Proof. As to the second identity, x(IR)
−1a iff aIRx iff aRx iff xR
−1a iff xJR−1a. The remaining ones are proved
similarly. 
3.2 Sets as formal contexts
Definition 5. For any set S we let PS := (SA,SX , I∆c).
Proposition 1. If S is a set, then P+S P(S).
Proof. Consider the map h : P(S)→ P+S defined by the assignment P 7→ (PA,P
c
X). To show that this map is
well defined it is enough to show that PA = (P
c
X)
↓. Indeed,
(PcX)
↓ = {a ∈ SA | ∀x[x ∈ P
c
X ⇒ aI∆cx]}
= {a ∈ SA | ∀x[x < PX ⇒ a , x]}
= {a ∈ SA | ∀x[a= x⇒ x ∈ PX ]}
= PA.
Verifying that h is a Boolean algebra isomorphism is straightforward and omitted. 
The next example shows that the requirement of the preservation of the complex algebra is not met by
associating S with the seemingly more obvious formal context (SA,SX , I∆).
Example 2. Let S = {a,b,c} and Q := (SA,SX , I∆). Then P(S) and Q
+ are represented by the Hasse
diagrams below, and are clearly non-isomorphic.
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PS Q
P+S P(S) Q
+
Remark 1. The construction of Definition 5 is perhaps the simplest way of associating a polarity PS with
a set S so that P+S  P(S). However, there are others, which are equivalent to the one above precisely in
the sense that Proposition 1 holds for each of them. Hence, in the category of formal contexts, all these
constructions will give rise to isomorphic formal contexts. We mention two more alternative constructions,
since they will become relevant in Section 7.2. The first one consists in defining PS as
PS := (SA,2× SX , I∆),
where 2 is the two-element Boolean algebra, and I∆, represented as characteristic function I∆ : SA× (2×
SX)→ 2, is defined by the assignment (a,(α,x)) 7→∆(a,x)→α , i.e. I∆(a,(α,x)) iff α = 1, or α = 0 and a, x.
Since 2×SX  SX0 ⊎SX1 , consider the map h : P(S)→ P
+
S defined by the assignment P 7→ (PA,P
c
X0
⊎SX1). To
show that this map is well defined it is enough to show that PA = (P
c
X0
⊎SX1)
↓. Indeed,
(PcX0 ⊎SX1)
↓ = {a ∈ SA | ∀(α,x)[(α,x) ∈ P
c
X0
⊎SX1 ⇒ I∆(a,(α,x))]}
= {a ∈ SA | ∀x[x < PX ⇒ a , x]}
= {a ∈ SA | ∀x[a= x⇒ x ∈ PX ]}
= PA.
The second construction consists in defining PS as
PS := (SA,2
SX , I∆),
where I∆, represented as characteristic function I∆ : SA× 2
SX → 2, is defined by the assignment (a, f ) 7→
f (a)→ 0, i.e. I∆(a, f ) iff a < f iff ∀x( f (x)⇒ a , x) iff ∀x(∆(a,x)⇒ f (x) = 0). Since 2
SX P(SX), consider
the map h : P(S)→ P+S defined by the assignment P 7→ (PA,{QX | Q ⊆ P
c}). To show that this map is well
defined it is enough to show that PA = {QX | Q⊆ P
c}↓. Indeed,
{QX | Q⊆ P
c}↓ = {a ∈ SA | ∀Q[Q⊆ P
c ⇒ I∆(a,QX)]}
= {a ∈ SA | ∀Q[Q∩P= ∅⇒ a < Q]}
= {a ∈ SA | ∀Q[a ∈ Q⇒ Q∩P , ∅]}
= PA.
3.3 Kripke frames as enriched formal contexts
In the present subsection, we extend the construction of the previous subsection from sets to Kripke frames.
For any Kripke frame X = (S,R), we let FX := (PS, IRc ,JRc) where PS = (SA,SX , I∆c) is defined as in the
13
previous subsection. Since the concept lattice of PS is isomorphic to P(S), the relations IRc ⊆ SA× SX and
JRc ⊆ SX × SA are trivially I∆c-compatible, hence FX is an enriched formal context (cf. Definition 3).
Recall that the complex algebra ofX is the Boolean algebra with operatorX+ = (P(S), [R],〈R〉) (cf. Sec-
tion 2.1). The next proposition verifies that the embedding of Kripke frames into enriched formal contexts
defined by the assignment X 7→ FX makes the diagram of Section 1 commute.
Proposition 2. If X is a Kripke frame, then F+X  X
+.
Proof. By Proposition 1, the complete lattice underlying F+X is P(S), so it is enough to show that for every
P⊆ S,
(〈R〉P)A = (J
(0)
Rc [PA])
↓.
(J
(0)
Rc [PA])
↓ = {x ∈ SX | ∀a[a ∈ PA ⇒ xJRca]}
↓
= ({x ∈ S | ∀a[a ∈ P⇒ xRca]}c)A
= ({x ∈ S | ∃a[a ∈ P & xRa]})A
= (〈R〉P)A.
Similarly, one can show that
([R]P)A = I
(0)
Rc [P
↑
A ] ([R〉P)A = H
(0)
Rc [PA] (〈R]P)A = (K
(0)
Rc [P
↑
A ])
↓.

Analogously to what we have observed in the previous subsection, representing R by means of e.g. the
relation IR rather than IRc would fail to preserve the complex algebras, as shown by the following example.
Example 3. Consider the Kripke frame X= (S,∆) and the enriched formal context F= (SA,SX , I∆c ,H∆).
3 By
Proposition 1, X+ and F+ are both based on P(S). Moreover, the operations [∆〉 and 〈∆] on X+ (i.e. the im-
possibility and skepticism operators on P(S) arising from ∆) coincide with the Boolean negation. However,
none of the operations [I∆], 〈J∆〉, [H∆〉, 〈K∆] is the Boolean negation on P(S).
Indeed, if P is a subset of S and h : P(S)→ P+S is defined as in the proof of Proposition 1, then the
extension of [I∆]h(P) is SA if P= S, is P
c
A if P is a coatom (i.e., the relative complement of a singleton), and
is ∅ in any other case; the extension of 〈J∆〉h(P) is ∅ if P = ∅, is P
c
A if P is a singleton, and is SA in any
other case; the extension of [H∆〉h(P) is SA if P= ∅, is PA if P is a singleton, and is ∅ in any other case; the
extension of 〈K∆]h(P) is ∅ if P= S, is PA if P is a coatom, and is SA in any other case.
Remark 2. The two alternative lifting constructions discussed in Remark 1 can be expanded as follows, so
as to accommodate the lifting of Kripke frames: as to the first one, for any Kripke frame X = (S,R), we let
FX := (PS, IR,JR) where PS := (SA,2×SX , I∆), and IR : SA×(2×SX)→ 2 is defined as (a,(α,x)) 7→ R(a,x)→
α , and JR : (2× SX)× SA → 2 is defined as ((α,x),a) 7→ R(x,a)→ α . As to the second one, for any Kripke
frame X = (S,R), we let FX := (PS, IR,JR) where PS := (SA,2
SX , I∆), and IR : SA× 2
SX → 2 is defined as
(a,Q) 7→ ∀x(R(a,x)⇒ x < Q), and JR : 2
SX × SA → 2 is defined as (Q,a) 7→ ∀x(R(x,a)⇒ x < Q).
(J
(0)
R [PA])
↓ (J
(0)
R [PA])
↓
= ({(α,x) | ∀a[a ∈ PA ⇒ (α,x)JRa]})
↓ = ({Q ∈ 2SX | ∀a[a ∈ PA ⇒ QJRa]})
↓
= ({(α,x) | α = 1 or x < R−1[P]})↓ = ({Q | ∀a[a ∈ P⇒∀y(R(y,a)⇒ y < Q)]})↓
= {a ∈ SA | ∃a[a ∈ P & xRa]} = ({Q | ∀y[y ∈ R
−1[P]⇒ y < Q]})↓
= (〈R〉P)A. = ({Q | Q⊆ (R
−1[P])c]})↓
= {a | ∀Q[Q⊆ (R−1[P])c ⇒ a < Q]}
= (R−1[P])A
= (〈R〉P)A.
3Notice that, for any polarity P = (A,X ,I), if ∆cA (resp. ∆
c
X ) is I-compatible, then every subset of A (resp. X) is Galois-stable, and
hence the concept lattice P+ is a Boolean algebra.
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3.4 Lifting properties of relations
Based on the construction introduced in Section 3.3, in the present subsection we discuss how properties of
accessibility relations of Kripke frames can be characterized as properties of their corresponding liftings. Let
us recall that the composition of R,T ⊆ S× S is R◦T := {(u,w) | (u,v) ∈ R and (v,w) ∈ T for some v ∈ S}.
The following definition slightly modifies those in [8, 57].
Definition 6. For any formal context P= (A,X , I),
1. for all relations R,T ⊆ X×A, the composition R ;T ⊆ X×A is such that, for any a ∈ A and x ∈ X,
(R ;T )(0)[a] = R(0)[I(0)[T (0)[a]]] or equivalently (R ;T )(1)[x] = R(1)[I(1)[T (1)[x]]];
2. for all relations R,T ⊆ A×X, the composition R ;T ⊆ A×X is such that, for any a ∈ A and x ∈ X,
(R ;T )(1)[a] = R(1)[I(0)[T (1)[a]]] or equivalently (R ;T )(0)[x] = R(0)[I(1)[T (0)[x]]].
Lemma 5. If R,T ⊆ X×A (resp. R,T ⊆ A×X) and R is I-compatible, then so is R ;T .
Proof. We only prove the statement for R,T ⊆X×A. Let a∈A. By definition, (R ;T )(0)[a] =R(0)[I(0)[T (0)[a]]];
since R is I-compatible, by Lemma 2.1, R(0)[I(0)[T (0)[a]]] is Galois-stable. By a similar argument one shows
that (R ;T )(1)[x] is Galois-stable for any x ∈ X . 
The following lemma is a variant of [8, Lemmas 6 and 7].
Lemma 6. 1. If R,T ⊆ A×X are I-compatible, then for any B⊆ A and Y ⊆ X,
(R;T )(0)[Y ] = R(0)[I(1)[T (0)[Y ]]] (R;T )(1)[B] = R(1)[I(0)[T (1)[B]]].
2. If R,T ⊆ X×A are I-compatible, then for any B⊆ A and Y ⊆ X,
(R;T )(1)[Y ] = R(1)[I(1)[T (1)[Y ]]] (R;T )(0)[B] = R(0)[I(0)[T (0)[B]]].
Proof. We only prove the first identity of item 1, the remaining identities being proved similarly.
R(0)[I(1)[T (0)[Y ]]] = R(0)[I(1)[T (0)[
⋃
x∈Y{x}]]]
= R(0)[I(1)[
⋂
x∈Y T
(0)[x]]] Lemma 1.5
= R(0)[I(1)[
⋂
x∈Y I
(0)[I(1)[T (0)[x]]]]] T (0)[x] Galois-stable
= R(0)[I(1)[I(0)[
⋃
x∈Y I
(1)[T (0)[x]]]]] Lemma 1.5
= R(0)[
⋃
x∈Y I
(1)[T (0)[x]]] Lemma 2
=
⋂
x∈Y R
(0)[I(1)[T (0)[x]]] Lemma 1.5
=
⋂
x∈Y (R;T )
(0)[x] Definition of R;T
= (R;T )(0)[
⋃
x∈Y {x}] Lemma 1.5
= (R;T )(0)[Y ].

Lemma 7. 1. If R,T,U ⊆ X×A are I-compatible, then (R ;T ) ;U = R ;(T ;U).
2. If R,T,U ⊆ A×X are I-compatible, then (R ;T ) ;U = R ;(T ;U).
Proof. We only show item 2. For every x ∈ X ,
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(R ;(T ;U))(0)[x] = R(0)[I(1)[(T ;U)(0)[x]]]
= R(0)[I(1)[T (0)[I(1)[U (0)[x]]]]]
= (R ;T )(0)[I(1)[U (0)[x]]]
= ((R ;T ) ;U)(0)[x].

Lemma 8. For all R,T ⊆ S× S,
1. I(R◦T)c = IRc ; IT c .
2. J(R◦T)c = JRc ;JT c .
Proof. We only prove item 2, the proof of item 1 being similar. For any a ∈ SA,
J(R◦T)c [a] = ({x ∈ S | ∀b[xRb⇒ bT
ca]})X
= ({x ∈ S | ∀b[bTa⇒ xRcb]})X
= ({x ∈ S | ∀b[b ∈ T (0)[a]⇒ xRcb]})X
= {x ∈ SX | ∀b[b ∈ (T
(0)[a])A ⇒ xJRcb]}
= J
(0)
Rc [(T
(0)[a])A]
= J
(0)
Rc [({x ∈ S | xTa})A]
= J
(0)
Rc [{x ∈ SX | xT
ca}↓]
= J
(0)
Rc [I
(0)[J
(0)
T c [a]]].

A relation R ⊆ S× S is sub-delta if R = {(z,z) | z ∈ Z} for some Z ⊆ S, and is dense if ∀s∀t[sRt ⇒
∃u(sRu & uRt)].
Proposition 3. For any Kripke frame X= (S,R),
1. R is reflexive iff IRc ⊆ I∆c iff J
−1
Rc ⊆ I∆c .
2. R is transitive iff IRc ⊆ IRc ; IRc iff JRc ⊆ JRc ;JRc .
3. R is symmetric iff IRc = J
−1
Rc iff JRc = I
−1
Rc .
4. R is sub-delta iff I∆c ⊆ IRc iff I∆c ⊆ J
−1
Rc .
5. R is dense iff IRc ; IRc ⊆ IRc iff JRc ;JRc ⊆ JRc .
Proof. 1. The reflexivity of R is encoded in the inclusion ∆ ⊆ R, which can be equivalently rewritten as
Rc ⊆ ∆c, which hence lifts as IRc ⊆ I∆c and JRc ⊆ J∆c , with the latter inclusion being equivalent to J
−1
Rc ⊆
J−1∆c = I(∆c)−1 = I∆c (cf. Lemma 4), given that ∆
c is symmetric.
2. The transitivity of R is encoded in the inclusion R ◦R ⊆ R, which can be equivalently rewritten as
Rc⊆ (R◦R)c, which hence lifts as IRc ⊆ I(R◦R)c, and by Lemma 8 can be equivalently rewritten as IRc ⊆ IRc ; IRc .
The second inclusion is proved similarly.
3. The symmetry of R is encoded in the identity R= R−1, which can be equivalently rewritten as Rc−1 =
Rc, which hence lifts as IRc = IRc−1 = J
−1
Rc or equivalently as JRc = I
−1
Rc .
4. R is sub-delta iff R ⊆ ∆, which can be equivalently rewritten as ∆c ⊆ Rc, which hence lifts as I∆c ⊆
IRc and J∆c ⊆ JRc , with the latter inclusion being equivalent to I∆c = I(∆c)−1 = J
−1
∆c ⊆ J
−1
Rc , given that ∆
c is
symmetric.
5. The denseness of R is encoded in the inclusion R ⊆ R ◦R, which can be equivalently rewritten as
(R◦R)c⊆Rc, which hence lifts as I(R◦R)c ⊆ IRc , and by Lemma 8 can be equivalently rewritten as IRc ; IRc ⊆ IRc .
The second inclusion is proved similarly. 
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The proposition above characterizes well known properties of binary relations on a given set in terms of
properties of their liftings. This characterization suggests the adoption of the following terminology:
Definition 7. For any polarity P= (A,X , I), a relation R⊆ A×X (resp. T ⊆ X×A) is
reflexive iff R⊆ I (resp. iff T−1 ⊆ I)
transitive iff R⊆ R ; R (resp. iff T ⊆ T ; T)
subdelta iff I ⊆ R (resp. iff I ⊆ T−1)
dense iff R ; R⊆ R (resp. iff T ; T ⊆ T).
4 Conceptual (co-)approximation spaces
In the present section we discuss the main contribution of this paper, namely the definition of conceptual
(co-)approximation spaces. This definition is both a generalization and a modularization of Pawlak’s approx-
imation spaces, in the spirit of contributions such as [82] and [73], aimed at modelling indiscernibility with
relations which are not necessarily equivalence relations, and at exploring the possibility of modelling the
interior and closure of sets via different relations.
Proposition 3 suggests a way for identifying, among the enriched formal contexts, the subclass of those
which properly generalize approximation spaces. Recall that for any enriched formal context F= (P,R,R^),
the relations R_ and R are defined as in Section 2.4.
Definition 8. A conceptual approximation space is an enriched formal context F= (P,R,R^) verifying the
following condition:
R;R ⊆ I. (8)
Such an F is reflexive if R ⊆ I and R ⊆ I, is symmetric if R^ = R_ or equivalently if R = R, and is
transitive if R ⊆ R ;R and R^ ⊆ R^ ;R^ (cf. Definition 7).
The following proposition is an immediate consequence of Propositions 3 and 2.
Proposition 4. If X= (S,R) is an approximation space, then FX = (PS, IRc ,JRc) is a reflexive, symmetric and
transitive conceptual approximation space such that F+X  X
+.
The proposition above states that, when restricted to formal contexts that correspond to sets, the notion
of reflexive, symmetric and transitive conceptual approximation space (cf. Definition 8) exactly captures the
classical notion of approximation spaces. The following proposition shows that, from the perspective of
logic, Definition 8 characterizes the axioms of the lattice-based counterpart of the modal logic of classical
approximation spaces. In particular, by item 1, condition (8) characterizes the minimal condition for ^ and
 to convey the upper and lower approximations of given concepts; moreover, items 2 and 4 (resp. 3 and 5)
exactly characterize the conditions under which the semantic  (resp.^) is an interior (resp. closure) operator.
Proposition 5. For any enriched formal context F= (P,R,R^):
1. F |= ϕ ⊢ ^ϕ iff R ;R ⊆ I.
2. F |= ϕ ⊢ ϕ iff R ⊆ I.
3. F |= ϕ ⊢ ^ϕ iff R ⊆ I.
4. F |= ϕ ⊢ ϕ iff R ⊆ R ;R.
5. F |= ^^ϕ ⊢ ^ϕ iff R^ ⊆ R^ ;R^.
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6. F |= ϕ ⊢ ^ϕ iff R^ ⊆ R_.
7. F |= ^ϕ ⊢ ϕ iff R_ ⊆ R^.
8. F |= ϕ ⊢ ϕ iff I ⊆ R.
9. F |= ^ϕ ⊢ ϕ iff I ⊆ R.
10. F |= ϕ ⊢ ϕ iff R ;R ⊆ R.
11. F |= ^ϕ ⊢ ^^ϕ iff R^ ;R^ ⊆ R^.
12. F |= ^ϕ ⊢ ϕ iff I ⊆ R;R.
Proof. Notice that the modal principles in all items of the lemma are Sahlqvist (cf. [15, Definition 3.5]).
Hence, they all have first order correspondents, both on Kripke frames and on enriched formal contexts,
which can be effectively computed e.g. by running the algorithm ALBA (cf. [15, Section 4]) on each of them.
In the remainder of this proof, we will use ALBA to compute these first-order correspondents on enriched
formal contexts. In what follows, the variables j are interpreted as elements of the set J := {(a↑↓,a↑) | a∈ A}
which completely join-generates F+, and the variables m as elements of M := {(x↓,x↓↑) | x ∈ X} which
completely meet-generates F+.
1.
∀p [p≤ ^p]
iff ∀p∀ j∀m[( j ≤ p & ^p≤ m)⇒ j ≤ m] first approximation
iff ∀p∀ j∀m[( j ≤ p & p≤ m)⇒ j ≤ m] adjunction
iff ∀ j∀m[ j ≤ m⇒ j ≤ m] Ackermann’s Lemma
iff ∀m[m≤ m]. J c. join-generates F+
Translating the universally quantified algebraic inequality above into its concrete representation in F+
requires using the interpretation of m as ranging inM and the definition of [R] and [R], as follows:
∀x ∈ X R
(0)

[I(1)[R
(0)

[x↓↑]]]⊆ x↓
iff ∀x ∈ X R
(0)

[I(1)[R
(0)

[x]]]⊆ I(0)[x] Lemma 2 since R is I-compatible
iff R;R ⊆ I. By definition
The proofs of the remaining items are collected in Appendix A.

The following are immediate consequences of the proposition above.
Corollary 1. For any enriched formal context F= (P,R,R^),
1. If R ⊆ I and R^ ⊆ I then R;R ⊆ I, hence F is a conceptual approximation space.
2. If I ⊆ R and I ⊆ R^ then I ⊆ R;R, hence F is a conceptual co-approximation space (cf. Definition
9 below).
3. If I ⊆ R then R ⊆ R;R.
4. If I ⊆ R^ then R^ ⊆ R^;R^.
5. If R ⊆ I then R;R ⊆ R.
6. If R^ ⊆ I then R^;R^ ⊆ R^.
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Proof. 1. If R ⊆ I and R^ ⊆ I, then by items 2 and 3 of Proposition 5, F |= ϕ ⊢ ϕ and F |= ϕ ⊢^ϕ , hence
F |= ϕ ⊢ ^ϕ , which, by item 1 of Proposition 5, is equivalent to R;R ⊆ I, as required. The proof of item
2 is similar.
3. If I ⊆ R then by item 7 of Proposition 5, F |= ϕ ⊢ ϕ , hence F |= ϕ ⊢ ϕ , which, by item 4 of
Proposition 5, is equivalent to R ⊆ R;R, as required. The proof of the remaining items are similar. 
In the classical setting, the ‘sub-delta’ condition (cf. Section 3.4, discussion before Proposition 3) identi-
fies a very restricted class of relations, namely those corresponding to tests, which are not much mentioned in
the literature of modal logic besides the context of PDL. Consequently, their corresponding modal axiomatic
principles p ⊢ p and ^p ⊢ p do not commonly occur in the literature either. However, as stated in Proposi-
tion 5.8 and .9, in the present setting these principles characterize a natural and meaningful class of relations
(which we refer to as ‘sub-delta’, by extension), which, as noticed in [38], has already cropped up in the
literature on rough formal concept analysis [46], and is potentially useful for applications (see Subsections
5.4 and 5.5 below).
Definition 9. A conceptual co-approximation space is an enriched formal context F = (P,R,R^) verifying
the following condition:
R;R ⊆ I. (9)
Such an F is sub-delta if I ⊆ R and I ⊆ R, is symmetric if R^ = R_ or equivalently if R = R, and is dense
if R ;R ⊆ R and R^ ;R^ ⊆ R^.
By items 8–11 of Proposition 5, sub-delta and dense conceptual co-approximation spaces are exactly
those such that [R] is a closure operator and 〈R^〉 is an interior operator. Hence these operations are suitable
to provide the upper and lower approximations of concepts, but in the reverse roles than those of Definition 8.
Proposition 5.12 characterizes condition (9) of the definition above precisely in terms of these reverse roles.
conceptual approximation spaces conceptual co-approximation spaces
reflexive ϕ ⊢ ϕ ϕ ⊢ ^ϕ ϕ ⊢ ϕ ^ϕ ⊢ ϕ sub-delta
transitive ϕ ⊢ ϕ ^^ϕ ⊢ ^ϕ ϕ ⊢ ϕ ^ϕ^^ ⊢ ϕ dense
5 Examples of conceptual (co-)approximation spaces
In this section, we illustrate, by way of examples, how conceptual (co-)approximation spaces can be used to
model a variety of situations, and how, under different interpretations, the modal logic of formal concepts can
be used to capture each of these situations.
5.1 Reflexive and symmetric conceptual approximation space
Consider a database, represented as a formal context P = (A,X , I). As usual, the intuitive understanding
of aIx is “object a has feature x”. Consider an I-compatible relation R ⊆ A×X , intuitively understood as
“there is evidence that object a has feature x”, or “object a demonstrably has feature x”. Under this intuitive
understanding, it is reasonable to assume that R⊆ I. Then, letting R := R and R^ := R
−1, for any concept
c ∈ P+,
[[[R]c]] = R
(0)[([c])] = {a ∈ A | ∀x(x ∈ ([c])⇒ aRx)}.
That is, the members of [R]c are exactly those objects that demonstrably have all the features in the descrip-
tion of c, and hence [R]c can be understood as the category of the ‘certified members’ of c. The assumption
that R⊆ I implies that [[[R]c]] = R
(0)[([c])]⊆ I(0)[([c])] = [[c]], hence [R]c is a sub-concept of c. Moreover,
([〈R^〉c]) = R
(1)[[[c]]] = {x ∈ X | ∀a(a ∈ [[c]]⇒ aRx)}.
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That is, 〈R^〉c is the concept described by the set of features that each member of c demonstrably has, and
hence 〈R^〉c can be understood as the category of the ‘potential members’ of c. Indeed, if a ∈ A lacks
some feature that each member of c demonstrably has, then it is impossible for a to be a member of c.
The assumption that R⊆ I implies that ([〈R^〉c]) = R
(1)[[[c]]]⊆ I(1)[[[c]]] = ([c]), and hence 〈R^〉c is a super-
concept of c. Hence, [R]c and 〈R^〉c can be taken as the lower and upper approximations of the concept
c, respectively. Notice that, while in approximation spaces the relation R relates indiscernible states, and
thus encodes the information we do not have, in the present setting we take the opposite perspective and let
R encode our (possibly partial) knowledge or information. This perspective is consistent with the fact that,
when an approximation space X is lifted to FX, the indiscernibility relation R is encoded into the liftings of
Rc. By construction, the enriched formal context F = (P,R,R^), with R and R^ as above, is a symmetric
and reflexive, hence dense (cf. Corollary 1.3 and .4) conceptual approximation space.
5.2 Reflexivity and transitivity used normatively
Besides having a descriptive function, conditions such as reflexivity and transitivity can also be used norma-
tively. To illustrate this point, let P = (A,X , I) represent the information of an undergraduate course, where
A is the set of definitions/notions the course is about, X is the set of properties, facts and results that can
be attributed to these notions, and aIx iff “notion a has property x”. Concepts arising from this represen-
tation are clusters of notions, intensionally described by Galois-stable sets of properties. Let R ⊆ A×X be
an I-compatible relation representing the amount of information about this course that a student remembers.
Then R being reflexive corresponds to the requirement that the student’s recollections be correct, and R being
transitive corresponds to the requirement that if the student remembers that notion a has property x, then
the student should also remember that notion a has every (other) property which is shared by all the notions
which the student remembers to have property x. So, under this interpretation, transitivity captures a desirable
requirement that well organized and rational memories ought to satisfy (but might not satisfy), and hence in
certain contexts, conditions such as reflexivity and transitivity can be used e.g. to discriminate between the
‘good’ and the ‘bad’ approximations of I. By items 2–5 of Proposition 5, these ‘good’ approximations can be
identified not only by first-order conditions on conceptual approximation spaces, but also by means of ‘modal
axioms’, i.e. sequents in the language of the modal logic of concepts (cf. Section 2.5).
5.3 Relativizations
A natural large class of reflexive and transitive conceptual approximation spaces consists of those enriched
formal contexts F = (A,X , I,R) such that R= I ∩ (B×Y ) for some B ⊆ A and Y ⊆ X , in which case we say
that R relativizes I to B ⊆ A and Y ⊆ X .4 Recall that a polarity is separated if for all a,b ∈ A if a , b then
(a,x) ∈ I and (b,x) < I for some x ∈ X , and for all x,y ∈ X if x , y then (a,x) ∈ I and (a,y) < I for some a ∈ A.
In separated polarities, ∅= X↓ = A↑ is Galois-stable.
Lemma 9. For any separated polarity P=(A,X , I) and any B⊆A andY ⊆X, the structure F=(A,X , I,R,R^)
such that R = R= I∩ (B×Y) and R^ = R
−1 is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive conceptual approxima-
tion space.
Proof. For any x ∈ X , either R(0)[x] = I(0)[x] if x ∈ Y , or R(0)[x] = ∅ if x < Y . In both cases, R(0)[x] is Galois-
stable. Likewise, one shows that R(1)[a] is Galois-stable for any a ∈ A, which completes the proof that F is
an enriched formal context. By construction, F is symmetric; moreover R⊆ I, hence F is also reflexive. To
show that F is transitive, it is enough to show that R(0)[x] ⊆ R(0)[I(1)[R(0)[x]]] for every x ∈ X . We proceed
by cases. If x < Y , then R(0)[x] = ∅ and hence the inclusion holds. If x ∈ Y , then R(0)[x] = I(0)[x]⊆ B, hence
I(1)[R(0)[x]] = R(1)[R(0)[x]]⊆ Y , hence R(0)[x]⊆ R(0)[R(1)[R(0)[x]]] = R(0)[I(1)[R(0)[x]]], as required. 
4When Y = X then we say that R relativizes I to B⊆ A, and when B= A then we say that R relativizes I to Y ⊆ X .
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Enriched formal contexts F= (A,X , I,R) such that R= I∩ (B×Y ) for some B⊆ A and Y ⊆ X naturally
arise in connection with databases endowed with designated sets of objects and/or features. Concrete ex-
amples of these abound: for instance, in databases of market products, subsets of features that are relevant
for the decision-making of certain classes of consumers can naturally be modelled as designated subsets; in
databases of words (as objects) and Twitter ‘tweets’ (as features), hashtags can be grouped together so as to
form designated subsets of objects; in longitudinal datasets, objects and features first appearing after a certain
point in time can form designated sets. Under this intuitive understanding, letting R := R and R^ := R
−1,
for any concept c ∈ P+,
[[[R]c]] = R
(0)[([c])] = {a ∈ A | ∀x(x ∈ ([c])⇒ aRx)}.
That is, [R]c is the empty category if ([c]) * Y , and if ([c]) ⊆ Y , then the members [R]c are exactly those
designated objects that have all the features in the description of c, and hence [R]c can be understood as the
designated restriction of c. Moreover,
([〈R^〉c]) = R
(1)[[[c]]] = {x ∈ X | ∀a(a ∈ [[c]]⇒ aRx)}.
That is, 〈R^〉c is the universal category if [[c]] * B, and if [[c]]⊆ B, then 〈R^〉c is the concept described by the
set of designated features that are common to all members of c, and hence, 〈R^〉c can be understood as the
designated enlargement of c.
5.4 Sub-delta and symmetric conceptual co-approximation space
Text databases can be modelled as formal contexts P = (A,X , I) such that A is a set of documents, X is a set
of words, and aIx is understood as “document a has word x as its keyword”. Formal concepts arising from
such a database can be understood as themes or topics, intentionally described by Galois-stable sets of words.
Consider an I-compatible relation R ⊆ A×X , intuitively understood as aRx iff “document a has word x or
one of its synonyms as its keyword”. This understanding makes it reasonable to assume that I ⊆ R. Then,
letting R := R and R^ := R
−1, for any concept (theme) c ∈ P+,
[[[R]c]] = R
(0)[([c])] = {a ∈ A | ∀x(x ∈ ([c])⇒ aRx)}.
That is, the members of [R]c are those documents the keywords of which include all the words describing
topic c or their synonyms. The assumption that I ⊆ R implies that [[c]] = I(0)[([c])] ⊆ R(0)[([c])] = [[[R]c]],
hence [R]c is a super-concept of c. Moreover,
([〈R^〉c]) = R
(1)[[[c]]] = {x ∈ X | ∀a(a ∈ [[c]]⇒ aRx)}.
That is, 〈R^〉c is the theme described by the set of common keywords of all documents in c and their syn-
onyms. The assumption that I ⊆ R implies that ([c]) = I(1)[[[c]]]⊆ R(1)[[[c]]] = ([〈R^〉c]), and hence 〈R^〉c is a
sub-concept of c. By construction, the enriched formal context F = (P,R,R^), with R and R^ as above is
a symmetric and sub-delta, hence transitive (cf. Corollary 1.5 and .6) conceptual co-approximation space.
5.5 Sub-delta and denseness used normatively
To illustrate how sub-delta and denseness can also be used normatively, let P= (A,X , I) represent a hospital,
where A is the set of patients, X is the set of symptoms, and aIx iff “patient a has symptom x”. Concepts
arising from this representation are syndromes, intensionally described by Galois-stable sets of symptoms.
Let R ⊆ A×X be an I-compatible relation the intuitive interpretation of which is aRx iff “according to the
doctor, patient a has symptom x” or “ the doctor attributes symptom x to patient a”. Under this interpretation,
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R being sub-delta corresponds to the requirement that if a patient has a symptom, then the doctor correctly
attributes this symptom to the patient. The relation R being dense corresponds to the requirement that for any
given patient a and symptom x, if, according to the doctor, a has all the symptoms shared by all patients to
whom he/she attributes symptom x, then the doctor will also attribute x to a. So, under this interpretation,
the denseness condition corresponds to a principled and grounded way of making attributions by default.
In conclusion, the first-order conditions of being sub-delta and dense capture desirable requirements that
doctors’ judgments ought to have, and hence, as discussed in previous examples, in certain situations they
can be useful to discriminate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ approximations of I. By items 8–11 of Proposition 5,
the ‘good’ approximations identified by these conditions can be identified also in the language of the modal
logic of concepts (cf. Section 2.5).
5.6 Conceptual bi-approximation spaces
In the previous subsections, we have discussed situations which are naturally formalized either by conceptual
approximation spaces or by conceptual co-approximation spaces. However, in certain cases we might want
to work with enriched formal contexts (A,X , I,R,S) such that the I-compatible relations R and S give rise to
a co-approximation space and to an approximation space respectively. We will refer to these structures as
conceptual bi-approximation spaces. Examples of conceptual bi-approximation spaces naturally arise in con-
nection with Kent’s rough formal contexts [46], as is discussed in what follows (a more detailed presentation
can be found in [38, Section 3]).
Rough formal contexts, introduced by Kent in [46] as structures synthesizing approximation spaces and
formal contexts, are tuples G = (P,E) such that P = (A,X , I) is a polarity, and E ⊆ A×A is an equivalence
relation. For every a ∈ A we let (a)E := {b ∈ A | aEb}. The relation E induces two relations R,S ⊆ A× I
approximating I, defined as follows: for every a ∈ A and x ∈ X ,
aRx iff bIx for some b ∈ (a)E ; aSx iff bIx for all b ∈ (a)E . (10)
By definition, R and S are E-definable (i.e. R(0)[x] =
⋃
aRx(a)E and S
(0)[x] =
⋃
aSx(a)E for any x ∈ X), and E
being reflexive immediately implies that S ⊆ I and I ⊆ R. Intuitively, R can be understood as the lax version
of I determined by E , and S as its strict version determined by E . Let us assume that R and S are I-compatible.
This assumption does not imply that E is I-compatible: indeed, let G = (P,∆) for any polarity P such that
not all singleton sets of objects are Galois-stable. Hence, E = ∆ is not I-compatible, but E = ∆ implies that
R= S = I, hence R and S are I-compatible. However, under the assumption that E is also I-compatible5, the
following inclusions hold (cf. [38, Lemma 3])
R;R⊆ R and S ⊆ S;S.
Hence, rough formal contexts G = (P,E) such that E , R and S are I-compatible give naturally rise to con-
ceptual bi-approximation spaces the ‘approximation reduct’ of which is reflexive and transitive, and ‘co-
approximation reduct’ of which is sub-delta and dense.
5.7 Expanded modal language of Kent’s rough formal contexts
Related to what discussed in the previous subsection and in Section 2.6, in [38], a modal logic is introduced
for rough formal contextsG= (P,E) such that E , R and S are I-compatible. The modal signature of this logic
is {s,^s,ℓ,^ℓ}, where s and ^s (resp. ℓ and ^ℓ) are interpreted using S and S
−1 (resp. R and R−1). This
language can be expanded with negative modal connectives ⊲ and ◮ interpreted on rough formal contexts via
5In [38], rough formal contexts G as above such that R, S and E are I-compatible are referred to as amenable rough formal contexts,
cf. Definition 4 therein.
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the completely join-reversing operators [E〉 and [E−1〉 on P+ arising from E ⊆ A×A (cf. Section 2.6), and
such that for all c,d ∈ P+,
c≤ [E〉d iff d ≤ [E−1〉c.
Also for ⊲ and ◮, correspondence-type results similar to those of Proposition 5 hold, such as the following:
Proposition 6. For any enriched formal context F= (P,R⊲):
1. F |= ϕ ⊢ ⊲⊲ϕ iff R⊲ = R◮.
2. F |= ⊤≤ ⊲⊤ iff R⊲ = A×A.
3. F |= ϕ ∧⊲ϕ ⊢ ⊥ iff ∀a[a ∈ R
(0)
⊲
[a] ⇒ a ∈ X↓].
4. F |= ⊲ϕ ∧⊲⊲ϕ ⊢ ⊥ iff ∀a[a ∈ R
(0)
⊲
[a] ⇒ A⊆ R
(0)
⊲
[a]].
The proof of the proposition above can be found in Appendix A. The lemma below shows that, on rough
formal contexts such that E , R and S are I-compatible, the condition expressing the reflexivity (resp. transi-
tivity) of E is equivalent to the condition expressing the reflexivity (resp. transitivity) of S. Since the latter
conditions are modally definable as Ls,^s -inequalities, these results are preliminary to completely axioma-
tize the modal logic of rough formal contexts (more on this in Section 8).
Lemma 10. For any enriched formal context G= (P,R⊲), let S ⊆ A×X denote the lower approximation of
I induced by R⊲ ⊆ A×A. If S is I-compatible, then
1. ∆⊆ R⊲ iff S ⊆ I;
2. R⊲ ◦R⊲ ⊆ R⊲ iff S⊆ S ; S.
The proof of the lemma above can be found in Appendix A.
5.8 Expanded modal language with negative modalities
In the present section, we discuss a situation which can be modelled by polarity-based structures supporting
the semantics of negative modalities, similarly to the structures discussed in the previous subsection. Let
P = (A,X , I) where A is the set of producers (companies), X is the set of products, and aIx iff “company a
produces x”. Then, if a and b are companies, b is a total competitor of a (notation: aTb) iff a↑ ⊆ b↑, and are
relative competitors if b↑∩a↑ , ∅. By definition, T is an equivalence relation, while R is symmetric. When
T,R⊆ A×A are I-compatible relations, they give rise to the completely join-reversing operators [T 〉 and [R〉
on P+ such that, for every concept c ∈ P+,
[[[T 〉c]] = T (0)[[[c]]] = {a∈A | ∀b(b∈ [[c]]⇒ aTb)} and [[[R〉c]] =R(0)[[[c]]] = {a∈A | ∀b(b∈ [[c]]⇒ aRb)}.
That is, the members of [T 〉c (resp. [R〉c) are those companies which are total (resp. relative) competitors of
each company in c. It is interesting to notice that, while in Kent’s structures the relation E ⊆ A×A gives rise
to the two relations R,S ⊆ A×X approximating I, in the present case it is I ⊆ A×X which gives rise to two
relations R,S⊆ A×A.
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6 Conceptual rough algebras
Proposition 5 provides us with a modular link between logical axioms and subclasses of enriched formal con-
texts. This link can be extended to classes of algebras. In the present section, we introduce the classes of al-
gebras that are the ‘conceptual’ counterparts of the classes of rough algebras listed in Section 2.2, in the sense
that they can be understood as abstract representations of conceptual approximation and co-approximation
spaces, in the same way in which rough algebras are to approximation spaces. Algebras based on ideas de-
veloped in the present section have been introduced in [38] motivated by the algebraic and proof-theoretic
development of the logic of Kent’s rough formal contexts (cf. Section 5.7).
Definition 10. A conceptual (co-)rough algebra is a structure A= (L,,^) such that L is a complete lattice,
and  and ^ are unary operations on L such that  is completely meet-preserving, ^ is completely join-
preserving, and for any a ∈ L,
a≤ ^a (resp. ^a≤ a). (11)
A conceptual (co-)rough algebra A as above is reflexive if for any a ∈ L,
a≤ a and a≤ ^a, (12)
is transitive if for any a ∈ L,
a≤ a and ^^a≤ ^a, (13)
is symmetric if for any a ∈ L,
a≤ ^a and ^a≤ a, (14)
is sub-delta if for any a ∈ L,
a≤ a and ^a≤ a, (15)
and is dense if for any a ∈ L,
a≤ a and ^a≤ ^^a. (16)
We let RA+ (resp. CA+) denote the class of conceptual rough algebras (resp. co-rough algebras).
Proposition 7. If A= (L,,^) ∈ RA+∪CA+, then A  F+ for some conceptual (co-)approximation space
F. If A validates any of the inequalities (11)-(16), then so does F.
Proof. By assumption, L is a complete lattice, hence L  P+ for some polarity P= (A,X , I) (cf. Theorem 1).
For any a ∈ A and x ∈ X , let a := (a↑↓,a↑) ∈ P+  L and x := (x↓,x↓↑) ∈ P+  L. Let F := (P,R,R^), where
R ⊆ A×X and R^ ⊆ X×A are defined as follows: for every a ∈ A and x ∈ X ,
R
(0)

[x] := {b ∈ A | b≤ x}  [[x]] and R
(0)
^ [a] := {y ∈ X |^a≤ y}  ([^a]).
Then, recalling that A join-generates P+ identified with L, and X meet-generates P+ identified with L, the
definition above immediately implies that R and R^ are I-compatible. Moreover, for every x ∈ X ,
[[[R]x]] = R
(0)

[([x])] = R
(0)

[x↓↑] = R
(0)

[x]  [[x]],
which is enough to prove that [R]  , since both operations are completely meet-preserving and X meet-
generates P+. Analogously, one shows that [R^]  ^, which completes the proof of the first part of the
statement. The second part is an immediate consequence of Proposition 5. 
The following definition introduces the abstract versions of the algebras of Definition 10.
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Definition 11. An abstract conceptual (co-)rough algebra (acronyms acra and accra, respectively) is a struc-
ture A = (L,,^) such that L is a bounded lattice, and  and ^ are unary operations on L such that  is
finitely meet-preserving, ^ is finitely join-preserving, and for any a ∈ L,
a≤ ^a (resp. ^a≤ a).
An A as above is reflexive if for any a ∈ L,
a≤ a and a≤ ^a,
is transitive if for any a ∈ L,
a≤ a and ^^a≤ ^a,
is symmetric if for any a ∈ L,
a≤ ^a and ^a≤ a,
is sub-delta if for any a ∈ L,
a≤ a and ^a≤ a,
and is dense if for any a ∈ L,
a≤ a and ^a≤ ^^a.
We let RA (resp. CA) denote the class of abstract conceptual (co-)rough algebras.
Notice that reflexive and transitive acras are the ‘nondistributive’ (i.e. general lattice-based, hence concep-
tual) counterparts of topological quasi Boolean algebras (tqBa) (cf. [1]). In the next definition we introduce
them, together with their mirror-image version (cf. discussion in Section 4).
Definition 12. A conceptual tqBa is a reflexive and transitive acra A. A conceptual co-tqBa is a sub-delta
and dense accra A.
In the next definition we introduce the ‘nondistributive’ (i.e. general lattice-based) counterparts of the
topological quasi Boolean algebras 5 (tqBa5), intermediate algebras of types 2 and 3 (IA2 and IA3), and
pre-rough algebras (pra).
Definition 13. A conceptual tqBa (resp. co-tqBa) A as above is a conceptual tqBa5 (resp. co-tqBa5) if for
any a ∈ L,
^a≤ a and ^a≤ ^a. (17)
A conceptual tqBa5 (resp. co-tqBa5)A as above is a conceptual IA2 (resp. co-IA2) if for any a,b ∈ L,
(a∨b)≤ a∨b and ^a∧^b≤ ^(a∧b), (18)
and is a conceptual IA3 (resp. co-IA3) if for any a,b ∈ L,
a≤ b and ^a≤ ^b imply a≤ b. (19)
A conceptual prerough algebra (resp. conceptual co-prerough algebra) is a conceptual tqBa (resp. co-tqBa)
A verifying (17), (18) and (19).
7 Applications
In the present section, we apply suitably adapted versions of the methodology developed in the previous
sections to generalize – from predicates to concepts – three very different and mutually independent semantic
frameworks, respectively aimed at accounting for vagueness (Section 7.1), gradedness (Section 7.2), and
uncertainty (Section 7.3).
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7.1 Vague concepts
The vague vs discrete nature of categories is a central issue in the foundations of categorization theory,
since it concerns the limits of applicability of linguistic, perceptual, cognitive and informational categories.
Vague concepts such as ‘red’, ‘tall’, ‘heap’ or ‘house’ admit borderline cases, namely cases for which we are
uncertain as to whether the concept should apply or not. Closely related to this, vague predicates give rise to
paradoxes such as the sorites paradox [6], which in its best known formulation involves a heap of sand, from
which grains are individually removed. Under the assumption that removing a single grain does not turn a
heap into a non-heap, the paradox arises when considering what happens when the process is repeated enough
times: is a single remaining grain still a heap? If not, when did it change from a heap to a non-heap? The
assumption of the paradox can be formulated more abstractly as the following tolerance principle (cf. [9]):
if a predicate P applies to an object a, and a and b differ very little in respects relevant to the application of
the predicate P, then P also applies to b. In [9], vague predicates are defined as those for which the tolerance
principle holds, and a logical framework for the treatment of vague predicates is introduced which allows to
validate the tolerance principle while preserving modus ponens. The logical framework of [9] hinges on the
interplay among three notions of truth: the tolerant, the classical and the strict. Below we briefly report on
the main definitions6, and then we apply the insights developed in Section 3 to generalize this approach from
vague predicates to vague concepts.
A (propositional) T-model over a set AtProp of proposition letters is a structure M = (D,{∼p| p ∈
AtProp},V ), such that D is a nonempty set, ∼p ⊆ D×D is reflexive and symmetric for every p ∈ AtProp,
and V : AtProp → P(D) is a map. Propositional formulas ϕ are satisfied classically at states a ∈ D on T-
models M in the usual way (in symbols: M,a  ϕ); in addition, the strict and tolerant satisfaction relations
(in symbols: M,a s ϕ andM,a t ϕ) are defined recursively as follows:
M,a t p iff M,b  p for some b ∈ D such that a∼p b;
M,a s p iff M,b  p for every b ∈D such that a∼p b;
M,a t ¬ϕ iff M,a 1s ϕ ;
M,a s ¬ϕ iff M,a 1t ϕ ;
M,a t ϕ ∧ψ iff M,a t ϕ andM,a t ψ ;
M,a s ϕ ∧ψ iff M,a s ϕ andM,a s ψ .
Letting V t(ϕ) := {a ∈ D | M,a t ϕ} and V s(ϕ) := {a ∈ D | M,a s ϕ}, the following inclusions readily
follow from the definitions above:
V s(ϕ)⊆V (ϕ)⊆V t(ϕ).
Notice that the first two clauses in the definition of t and s can be rewritten as follows (cf. [75]):
M,a t p iff M,a  〈∼p〉p;
M,a s p iff M,a  [∼p]p.
Clearly, T-models are generalizations of approximation spaces in which indiscernibility relations do no not
need to be transitive7, and are specific for each predicate. Hence, the insights and the lifting construction of
Section 3.3 can be applied to T-models, analogously to what is done in Section 4. Doing so, we readily arrive
at the following
Definition 14. A conceptual T-model over a set AtProp of atomic category labels is a structureM= (P,{Rp |
p ∈ AtProp},V) such that P = (A,X , I) is a polarity, Rp ⊆ A× X is I-compatible and reflexive for every
p ∈ AtProp, and V : AtProp→ P+ is a map.
6For simplicity of presentation, here we only report on the propositional fragment of the framework of [9].
7Dropping the transitivity requirement has been independently explored in the Rough Set Theory literature, see e.g. [79].
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In each conceptual T-model M, the standard membership and description relations for concept-terms ϕ
of the propositional lattice language L over AtProp (in symbols: M,a  ϕ and M,x ≻ ϕ) are defined as
indicated in Section 2.5.
Definition 15. For any conceptual T-modelM, the following strict and tolerant membership and description
relations:
M,a s ϕ which reads: object a is definitely a member of category ϕ
M,x≻s ϕ which reads: feature x definitely describes category ϕ
M,a t ϕ which reads: object a is loosely a member of category ϕ
M,x≻t ϕ which reads: feature x loosely describes category ϕ
are defined recursively as follows:
M,x≻t p iff M,x≻ 〈Rp〉p iff x ∈ R
(1)
p [[[p]]] =: ([p])t;
M,a t p iff a ∈ [[〈Rp〉p]] iff a ∈ I
(0)[([p])t ] =: [[p]]t;
M,x≻t ⊤ iff M,x≻ 〈Rp〉⊤ iff x ∈ R
(1)
p [A] =: ([⊤])t;
M,a t ⊤ iff a ∈ [[〈Rp〉⊤]] iff a ∈ I
(0)[([⊤])t ] =: [[⊤]]t;
M,a t ⊥ iff M,a  〈Rp〉⊥ =⊥ iff a ∈ [[⊥]] =: [[⊥]]
t;
M,x≻t ⊥ iff x ∈ ([⊥]) =: ([⊥])t;
M,a t ϕ ∧ψ iff M,a t ϕ andM,a t ψ iff a ∈ [[ϕ ]]t ∩ [[ψ ]]t;
M,x≻t ϕ ∧ψ iff x ∈ I(1)[[[ϕ ]]t ∩ [[ψ ]]t ];
M,x≻t ϕ ∨ψ iff M,x≻t ϕ andM,x≻t ψ iff x ∈ ([ϕ ])t ∩ ([ψ ])t;
M,a t ϕ ∨ψ iff a ∈ I(0)[([ϕ ])t ∩ ([ψ ])t ];
M,a s p iff M,a  [Rp]p iff a ∈ R
(0)
p [([p])] =: [[p]]s;
M,x≻s p iff x ∈ ([[Rp]p]) iff x ∈ I
(1)[[[p]]s] =: ([p])s;
M,a s ⊤ iff M,a  [Rp]⊤=⊤ always;
M,x≻s ⊤ iff x ∈ I(1)[[[⊤]]s] = A↑;
M,a s ⊥ iff M,a  [Rp]⊥ iff a ∈ R
(0)
p [X ] =: [[⊥]]s;
M,x≻s ⊥ iff x ∈ ([[Rp]⊥]) iff x ∈ I
(1)[[[⊥]]s] =: ([⊥])s;
M,a s ϕ ∧ψ iff M,a s ϕ andM,a s ψ iff a ∈ [[ϕ ]]s∩ [[ψ ]]s;
M,x≻s ϕ ∧ψ iff x ∈ I(1)[[[ϕ ]]s∩ [[ψ ]]s];
M,x≻s ϕ ∨ψ iff M,x≻s ϕ andM,x≻s ψ iff x ∈ ([ϕ ])s∩ ([ψ ])s;
M,a s ϕ ∨ψ iff a ∈ I(0)[([ϕ ])s∩ ([ψ ])s].
Hence, any conceptual T-modelM= (P,{Rp | p ∈ AtProp},V) induces the tolerant and strict interpreta-
tions V t ,V s : L → P+ of L -terms, defined as follows:
V t(p) = ((R
(1)
p [[[p]]])↓,R
(1)
p [[[p]]]) V s(p) = (R
(0)
p [([p])],(R
(0)
p [([p])])↑)
V t(⊤) = ((R
(1)
p [A])
↓,R
(1)
p [A]) V
s(⊤) = (A,A↑)
V t(⊥) = (X↓,X) V s(⊥) = (R
(0)
p [X ],(R
(0)
p [X ])
↑)
V t(ϕ ∧ψ) = ([[ϕ ]]t ∩ [[ψ ]]t ,([[ϕ ]]t ∩ [[ψ ]]t)↑) V s(ϕ ∧ψ) = ([[ϕ ]]s∩ [[ψ ]]s,([[ϕ ]]s∩ [[ψ ]]s)↑)
V t(ϕ ∨ψ) = ((([ϕ ])t ∩ ([ψ ])t)↓,([ϕ ])t ∩ ([ψ ])t) V s(ϕ ∨ψ) = ((([ϕ ])s∩ ([ψ ])s)↓,([ϕ ])s∩ ([ψ ])s).
Lemma 11. For any conceptual T-modelM and any L -term ϕ ,
V s(ϕ)≤V (ϕ)≤V t(ϕ).
27
Proof. By induction on ϕ . As to the base cases, Rp ⊆ I for every p ∈AtProp implies that [[p]]
s = R
(0)
p [([p])]⊆
I(0)[([p])] = [[p]] and ([p])t = R
(1)
p [[[p]]]⊆ I
(1)[[[p]]] = ([p]), and moreover, [[⊥]]s = R
(0)
p [X ]⊆ I
(0)[X ] = [[⊥]] and
([⊤])t = R
(1)
p [A]⊆ I(1)[A] = ([⊤]). The induction steps are straightforward. 
Definition 16. For any conceptual T-modelM and any p ∈ AtProp, the relation Rp induces similarity rela-
tions on objects and on features defined as follows: for any a,b ∈ A and x,y ∈ X,
a∼Rpb iff R
(1)
p [a]⊆ b
↑ x∼Rpy iff R
(0)
p [x]⊆ y
↓.
We use the same symbol to denote both relations and rely on the input arguments (a,b for objects, x,y for
features) for disambiguation. Clearly, the reflexivity of Rp implies that each ∼Rp is reflexive. However, in
general these relations are neither transitive nor symmetric.The next lemma shows that when Rp is the lifting
of some (classical) similarity relation ∼p, the similarity relations ∼Rp induced by Rp are isomorphic copies
of ∼p.
Lemma 12. For every T-model M = (D,{∼p| p ∈ AtProp},V ), its associated conceptual T-model FM :=
((DA,DX , I∆c),{I∼cp | p ∈ AtProp},V) (cf. Section 3.3) is such that for every p ∈ AtProp and all d,d
′ ∈ D,
d ∼p d
′ iff d ∼I∼cp
d′.
Proof. In the displayed equivalence above, d ∼I∼cp
d′ refers both to d,d′ ∈ DA and to d,d
′ ∈ DX . For d,d
′ ∈
DA,
d ∼I∼cp
d′ iff I
(1)
∼cp
[d]⊆ (d′)↑
iff {e ∈ DX | dI∼cpe} ⊆ {e ∈DX | d
′I∆ce}
iff {e ∈ DX | d
′I∆ce}
c ⊆ {e ∈ DX | dI∼cpe}
c
iff d′ ∈ {e ∈ DX | dI∼cpe}
c {e ∈DX | d
′I∆ce}
c = {d′}
iff (d,d′) < I∼cp
iff (d,d′) <∼cp
iff d ∼p d
′.
The proof in the case in which d,d′ ∈ DX is similar, and is omitted. 
Lemma 13. For any conceptual T-modelM and any p ∈ AtProp,
1. IfM,a s p and a∼Rpb thenM,b 
t p;
2. IfM,x≻s p and x∼Rpy thenM,y≻
t p.
Proof. 1. The assumption M,a s p can be rewritten as a ∈ [[p]]s = R
(0)
p [([p])], i.e. ([p]) ⊆ R
(1)
p [a]. Hence,
R
(1)
p [[[p]]]⊆ I(1)[[[p]]] = ([p])⊆ R
(1)
p [a]. We need to show thatM,b t p, i.e. b ∈ (R
(1)
p [[[p]]])↓, i.e. R
(1)
p [[[p]]]⊆
b↑. The latter inclusion immediately follows from R
(1)
p [[[p]]] ⊆ R
(1)
p [a] and the assumption that a∼Rpb,
i.e. R
(1)
p [a]⊆ b
↑. The proof of the second item is similar, and is omitted. 
As discussed in [9, Section 3.6], the semantics of T-models successfully handles e.g. the following version
of the sorites paradox, formulated in terms of the strict and the tolerant notions of truth:
IfM,a1 
s p and ai∼pai+1 for every 1≤ i≤ n thenM,an 
t p. (20)
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Indeed, since ∼p does not need to be transitive, T-models exist which falsify (20), while for every T-model
M,
ifM,a s p and a∼pb thenM,b 
v p. (21)
The following concept-versions of the sorites paradox, formulated both w.r.t. objects and w.r.t. features,
can be handled equally well by conceptual T-models:
IfM,a1 
s p and ai∼Rpai+1 for every 1≤ i≤ n thenM,an 
t p (22)
IfM,x≻s p and xi∼Rpxi+1 for every 1≤ i≤ n thenM,xn ≻
t p. (23)
Indeed, by Lemma 13, each single step is valid on every conceptual T-model; however, if M is a T-model
falsifying (20), then by Lemma 12, its associated conceptual T-model FM will falsify (22) and (23).
7.2 Many-valued semantics for the modal logic of concepts
In [29, 30] several kinds of many-valued Kripke frame semantics are proposed for the language of normal
modal logic. Based on this, [4] introduces complete axiomatizations for the many-valued counterparts of
the classical normal modal logic K corresponding to some of the semantic settings introduced there. In
the present subsection, we illustrate how the insights and results developed in the previous sections can be
suitably adapted to generalize the logical framework of [29, 30, 4] from (many-valued) Kripke frames to
(many-valued) enriched formal contexts. Below, we will first provide a brief account of the framework from
[29, 30, 4] we are going to generalize. Since it is intended as an illustration, our account will cover only the
portion that is directly involved in the subsequent generalization, and we leave a more complete treatment for
a separate paper.
Many-valued modal logic. For an arbitrary but fixed complete Heyting algebra A (understood as the alge-
bra of truth-values), an A-Kripke frame is a structure X = (W,R) such thatW is a nonempty set and R is an
A-valued relation, i.e. it is a map R :W ×W →A which we will equivalent represent as R :W → AW , where
AW denotes the set of maps f :W → A, so R[w] :W → A for every w ∈W . As is well known, the algebraic
structure of A lifts to AW by defining the operations pointwise; moreover, any A-valued relation R induces
operations [R],〈R〉 : AW →AW such that, for every f :W →A,
[R] f : W →A 〈R〉 f : W →A
w 7→
∧
v∈W (R[w](v)→ f (v)) w 7→
∨
v∈W (R[w](v)∧ f (v)).
An A-model over a set AtProp of atomic propositions is a tupleM= (F,V ) such that F is an A-Kripke frame
and V : AtProp → AW . Every such V has a unique homomorphic extension, also denoted V : L → AW ,
where L denotes the {,^} modal language over AtProp, which in its turn induces α-satisfaction relations
for each α ∈ A (in symbols: M,w α ϕ), such that for every ϕ ∈L ,
M,w α ϕ iff α ≤ (V (ϕ))(w).
This can be equivalently expressed by means of the following recursive definition:
M,w α p iff α ≤ (V (p))(w);
M,w α ⊤ iff α ≤ (V (⊤))(w) i.e. always;
M,w α ⊥ iff α ≤ (V (⊥))(w) i.e. iff α =⊥A;
M,w α ϕ ∧ψ iff M,w α ϕ andM,w α ψ ;
M,w α ϕ ∨ψ iff M,w α ϕ orM,w α ψ ;
M,w α ϕ → ψ iff (V (ϕ))(w)∧α ≤ (V (ψ))(w);
M,w α ϕ iff α ≤ ([R](V (ϕ)))(w);
M,w α ^ϕ iff α ≤ (〈R〉(V (ϕ)))(w).
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When A is the Boolean algebra 2, these definitions coincide with the usual ones in classical modal logic. For
every α ∈A, let {α\w} :W →A be defined by v 7→ α if v=w and v 7→ ⊥A if v ,w. Then, for every f ∈AW ,
f =
∨
w∈W
{ f (w)\w}. (24)
For any setW , the A-subsethood relation between elements of AW is the map SW :A
W ×AW →A defined as
SW ( f ,g) :=
∧
w∈W ( f (w)→ g(w)). If SW ( f ,g) = 1 we also write f ⊆ g.
Many-valued FCA. AnyA-valued relation R :U×W →A induces maps R(0)[−] :AW →AU and R(1)[−] :
AU →AW given by the following assignments: for every f :U →A and every u :W → A,
R(1)[ f ] : W →A R(0)[u] : U →A
x 7→
∧
a∈U( f (a)→ R(a,x)) a 7→
∧
x∈W (u(x)→ R(a,x))
These maps are such that, for every f ∈AA and every u ∈ AX ,
SA( f ,R
(0)[u]) = SX(u,R
(1)[ f ]), (25)
that is, the pair of maps R(1)[·] and R(0)[·] form an A-Galois connection.
A formal A-context or A-polarity (cf. [2]) is a structure P = (A,X , I) such that A and X are sets and
I : A×X→A. Any formalA-context induces maps (·)↑ :AA→AX and (·)↓ :AX →AA given by (·)↑ = I(1)[·]
and (·)↓ = I(0)[·].
In [2], it is shown that every A-Galois connection arises from some formal A-context. A formal A-
concept is a pair ( f ,u) ∈ AA×AX such that f ↑ = u and u↓ = f . It follows immediately from this definition
that if ( f ,u) is a formal A-concept, then f ↑↓ = f and u↓↑ = u, that is, f and u are stable. The set of formal
A-concepts can be partially ordered as follows:
( f ,u) ≤ (g,v) iff f ⊆ g iff v⊆ u.
Ordered in this way, the set of the formal A-concepts of P is a complete lattice, which we denote P+.
Many-valued enriched formal contexts. Building on [2], we can generalize the definition of enriched
formal contexts to the many-valued setting as follows:
Definition 17. An enriched formal A-context is a structure F = (P,R,R^) such that P = (A,X , I) is a for-
mal A-context and R : A×X → A and R^ : X ×A→ A are I-compatible, i.e. R
(0)
 [{α\x}], R
(1)
 [{α\a}],
R
(0)
^ [{α\a}] and R
(1)
^ [{α\x}] are stable for every α ∈A, a ∈ A and x ∈ X.
Definition 18. The complex algebra of an enriched formal A-context F = (P,R,R^) is the algebra F
+ =
(P+, [R],〈R^〉)where [R],〈R^〉 : P
+→ P+ are defined by the following assignments: for every c=([[c]],([c]))∈
P+,
[R]c= (R
(0)

[([c])],(R
(0)

[([c])])↑) and 〈R^〉c= ((R
(0)
^ [[[c]]])
↓,R
(0)
^ [[[c]]]).
As in the crisp setting, the I-compatibility of R and R^ guarantees that the operations [R],〈R^〉 (and in
fact also their adjoints) are well defined:
Lemma 14. 1. The following are equivalent for every formalA-context P=(A,X , I) and everyA-relation
R : A×X →A:
(i) R(0)[{α/x}] is Galois-stable for every x ∈ X and α ∈ A;
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(ii) R(0)[u] is Galois-stable for every u : X → A;
(iii) R(1)[ f ] = R(1)[ f ↑↓] for every f : A→ A.
2. The following are equivalent for every formalA-context P= (A,X , I) and everyA-relation R : A×X→
A:
(i) R(1)[{α/a}] is Galois-stable for every a ∈ A and α ∈ A;
(ii) R(1)[ f ] is Galois-stable, for every f : A→A;
(iii) R(0)[u] = R(0)[u↓↑] for every u : X →A.
Proof. 1. Since R(0)[
∨
j∈J u j] =
∧
j∈J R
(0)[u j], it is immediate that (i) and (ii) are equivalent. Therefore let us
show that (ii) and (iii) are equivalent. By (25) it follows that
f ⊆ R(0)[u]⇐⇒ u⊆ R(1)[ f ]. (26)
Let us assume that R(0)[u] is stable for every u : X → A and show that R(1)[ f ] ⊆ R(1)[ f ↑↓], the converse
inclusion following from the antitonicity of R(1):
R(1)[ f ]⊆ R(1)[ f ]
⇐⇒ f ⊆ R(0)[R(1)[ f ]] (by 26)
⇐⇒ f ↑↓ ⊆ R(0)[R(1)[ f ]] (R(0)[R(1)[ f ]] is stable by assumption)
⇐⇒ R(1)[ f ]⊆ R(1)[ f ↑↓]. (by 26)
Now assume that R(1)[ f ] = R(1)[ f ↑↓] for every f : A→ A. We want to show that (R(0)[u])↑↓ ⊆ R(0)[u]:
R(0)[u]⊆ R(0)[u]
⇐⇒ u⊆ R(1)[R(0)[u]] (by 26)
⇐⇒ u⊆ R(1)[(R(0)[u])↑↓] (R(1)[ f ] = R(1)[ f ↑↓] by assumption)
⇐⇒ (R(0)[u])↑↓ ⊆ R(0)[u]. (by 26)
The proof of 2. follows verbatim. 
Lemma 15. For any enriched formal A-context F = (P,R,R^), the algebra F
+ = (P+, [R],〈R^〉) is a
complete normal lattice expansion such that [R] is completely meet-preserving and 〈R^〉 is completely join-
preserving.
Proof. Let us show that [R] is completely meet-preserving. Let f j : A→A be stable concepts. Notice that
(
∨
j∈J
( f j)
↑)↓↑ = (
∧
j∈J
f j)
↑.
We have
R
(0)

[(
∨
j∈J
( f j)
↑)↓↑] = R
(0)

[
∨
j∈J
( f j)
↑] =
∧
j ∈ JR
(0)

[( f j)
↑],
the first equality following from Lemma 14.2(iii). The proof for 〈R^〉 goes similarly using Lemma 14.1(iii).

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Applying the methodology developed in the previous sections, in what follows, we embed (and thereby
represent) sets into A-polarities and A-Kripke frames into enriched formal A-contexts so as to preserve their
complex algebras.
Definition 19. For any set W, the formal A-context associated with W is
PW := (W,A×W, I∆),
where I∆ :W × (A×W )→ A is defined by I∆(w,(α,v)) = ∆(w,v)→ α . That is, I∆(w,(α,v)) = ⊤ if w , v
and I∆(w,(α,v)) = α if w= v. Alternatively, the formal A-context associated with W is
PW := (W,A
W , I∆),
where I∆ :W ×A
W →A is defined by I∆(w, f ) =
∧
z∈Z( f (z)∧∆(w,z)→ 0) = f (w)→ 0.
Lemma 16. Let W be a set. Then P+W  A
W .
Proof. It is enough to show that f = f ↑↓ for any f ∈ AW . Using the first definition, for any f :W → A, the
map f ↑ :A×W → A is defined as follows: for every (β ,v) ∈A×W ,
f ↑(β ,v) =
∧
w∈W ( f (w)→ I∆(w,(β ,v)))
= f (v)→ β .
The map f ↑↓ :W → A is defined as follows: for every w ∈W ,
f ↑↓(w) =
∧
(β ,v)∈A×W ( f
↑(β ,v)→ I∆(w,(β ,v)))
=
∧
β∈A( f
↑(β ,w)→ β )
=
∧
β∈A(( f (w)→ β )→ β )
= f (w). (∗)
The identity marked with (∗) is an instance of a=
∧
b∈A(a→ b)→ b which is valid in any complete Heyting
algebra A: indeed,
∧
b∈A(a→ b)→ b ≤ (a→ a)→ a = ⊤→ a = a; conversely, a ≤
∧
b∈A(a→ b)→ b iff
a≤ (a→ b)→ b for each b, iff a∧ (a→ b)≤ b for each b, which is always true.
Using the second definition, for any f :W → A, the map f ↑ : AW → A is defined as follows: for every
g :W → A,
f ↑(g) =
∧
w∈W ( f (w)→ I∆(w,g))
=
∧
w∈W ( f (w)→ (g(w)→ 0)
=
∧
w∈W (( f (w)∧g(w))→ 0)
= (
∨
w∈W f (w)∧g(w))→ 0
= ¬(
∨
w∈W f (w)∧g(w)).
Hence, f ↑( f ) = ¬(
∨
w∈W f (w)∧ f (w)) = ¬(
∨
w∈W f (w)). The map f
↑↓ :W → A is defined as follows: for
every w ∈W ,
f ↑↓(w) =
∧
g∈AW ( f
↑(g)→ I∆(w,g))
=
∧
g∈AW ( f
↑(g)→ (g(w)→ 0))
=
∧
g∈AW (¬(
∨
v∈W f (v)∧g(v))∧g(w))→ 0)
= ¬(
∨
g∈AW (¬(
∨
v∈W f (v)∧g(v))∧g(w)))
= f (w). (∗)
for g= f , ¬(
∨
v∈W f (v)∧ f (w))≤¬(
∨
v∈W f (v)∧ f (v))∧ f (w))≤ (
∨
g∈AW (¬(
∨
v∈W f (v)∧g(v))∧g(w))) 
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Definition 20. For any A-Kripke frame X= (W,R), the enriched formal A-context associated with X is
FX := (PW , IR,JR),
where PW is as in Definition 19, and IR :W × (A×W )→ A is defined by IR(w,(α,v)) = R(w,v)→ α and
JR : (A×W)×W →A is defined by JR((α,w),v) = R(w,v)→ α .
Lemma 17. Let X= (W,R) be an A-Kripke frame. Then F+X  (A
W , [R],〈R〉).
Proof. By Lemma 16, it is enough to show that, for every f ∈ AW ,
[R] f = I
(0)
R [ f
↑] and 〈R〉 f = (J
(0)
R [ f ])
↓. (27)
To prove the first identity, recall that [R] f :W → A is defined as
([R] f )(w) =
∧
v∈W
(R[w](v)→ f (v)),
and I
(0)
R [ f
↑] :W → A is defined as
(I
(0)
R [ f
↑])(w) =
∧
(β ,v)∈A×W
( f ↑(β ,v)→ IR(w,(β ,v))) =
∧
(β ,v)∈A×W
(( f (v)→ β )→ (R(w,v)→ β )).
Hence,
(I
(0)
R [ f
↑])(w) =
∧
(β ,v)∈A×W (( f (v)→ β )→ (R(w,v)→ β ))
≤
∧
v∈W (( f (v)→ f (v))→ (R(w,v)→ f (v))) for β := f (v)
=
∧
v∈W ⊤→ (R(w,v)→ f (v)))
=
∧
v∈W R(w,v)→ f (v))
= ([R] f )(w).
To show that ∧
v∈W
(R(w,v)→ f (v))) ≤
∧
(β ,v)∈A×W
(( f (v)→ β )→ (R(w,v)→ β )),
it is enough to show that for each (β ,v) ∈ A×W ,
R(w,v)→ f (v)≤ ( f (v)→ β )→ (R(w,v)→ β ).
The inequality above is an instance of b→ a≤ (a→ c)→ (b→ c), which is valid in every Heyting algebra.
To see this,
b→ a≤ (a→ c)→ (b→ c)
iff (b→ a)∧ (a→ c)≤ b→ c
iff b∧ (b→ a)∧ (a→ c)≤ c
and indeed, b∧ (b→ a)∧ (a→ c)≤ a∧ (a→ c)≤ c.
To prove that 〈R〉 f = (J
(0)
R [ f ])
↓, recall that 〈R〉 f :W → A is defined as
(〈R〉 f )(w) =
∨
v∈W
(R[w](v)∧ f (v)),
and (J
(0)
R [ f ])
↓ :W →A is defined as
(J
(0)
R [ f ])
↓(w) =
∧
(β ,v)∈A×W
(J
(0)
R [ f ](β ,v)→ I∆(w,(β ,v))) =
∧
β∈A
(J
(0)
R [ f ](β ,v)→ β ).
Hence,
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(J
(0)
R [ f ])
↓(w) =
∧
(β ,v)∈A×W (J
(0)
R [ f ](β ,v)→ I∆(w,(β ,v)))
=
∧
β∈A(J
(0)
R [ f ](β ,w)→ β )
=
∧
β∈A(
∧
v∈W ( f (v)→ (R(v,w)→ β ))→ β )
=
∧
β∈A(
∧
v∈W (( f (v)∧R(v,w))→ β )→ β )
=
∧
β∈A((
∨
v∈W ( f (v)∧R(v,w))→ β )→ β )
=
∧
β∈A((〈R〉 f )(w)→ β )→ β )
= (〈R〉 f )(w).

Lifting reflexivity. In the crisp setting of the previous sections, we discussed how properties of Kripke
frames can be lifted to properties of their corresponding enriched formal contexts, and we used these property-
lifting results to motivate the definition of conceptual approximation spaces (cf. Sections 3.4 and 4). Below,
we illustrate, by way of an example, that this ‘lifting method’ works also in the many-valued setting. Specifi-
cally, we show how the property of reflexivity ofA-Kripke frames can be lifted to enriched formalA-contexts.
An A-Kripke frame X = (W,R) is reflexive (cf. [32, 5]) if R(w,w) = ⊤A for all w ∈W , or equivalently, if
∆(w,v)≤ R(w,v) for all w,v ∈W , where ∆(w,v) =⊤ if w= v and ∆(w,v) =⊥ if w , v.
Proposition 8. If X = (W,R) is an A-Kripke frame, X is reflexive iff IR(w,(α,v)) ≤ I∆(w,(α,v)) for all
w,v ∈W and α ∈ A.
Proof. If R is reflexive, i.e. if ∆(w,v)≤ R(w,v) for all w,v ∈W , then IR(w,(α,v)) = R(w,v)→ α ≤ ∆(w,v)→
α = I∆(w,(α,v)) for any α ∈ A. Conversely, suppose that IR(w,(α,v)) ≤ I∆(w,(α,v)) for all w,v ∈W and
α ∈ A, i.e. R(w,v)→ α ≤ ∆(w,v)→ α for all w,v and α . Then in particular, setting α = R(w,v), we have
⊤A = R(w,v)→ R(w,v)≤ ∆(w,v)→ R(w,v), and hence, by residuation, ∆(w,v)≤ R(w,v). 
Analogously to Proposition 3 eliciting Definition 7, Proposition 8 elicits the following
Definition 21. Let P= (A,X , I) be anA-polarity. AnA-relation R : A×X→A is reflexive iff R(a,x)≤ I(a,x)
for all a ∈ A and x ∈ X.
Many-valued semantics for the logic of concepts. The discussion and results above justify the introduc-
tion of the following many-valued semantic framework for the modal logic of concepts:
Definition 22. A conceptual A-model over a set AtProp of atomic propositions is a tuple M = (F,V ) such
that F = (A,X , I,R,R^) is an enriched formal A-context and V : AtProp → F
+. For every p ∈ AtProp, let
V (p) := ([[p]],([p])), where [[p]] : A→ A and ([p]) : X → A, and [[p]]↑ = ([p]) and ([p])↓ = [[p]]. Letting L
denote the {,^} modal language over AtProp, every V as above has a unique homomorphic extension, also
denoted V : L → F+, defined as follows:
V (p) = ([[p]],([p]))
V (⊤) = (⊤A
A
,(⊤A
A
)↑)
V (⊥) = ((⊤A
X
)↓,⊤A
X
)
V (ϕ ∧ψ) = ([[ϕ ]]∧ [[ψ ]],([[ϕ ]]∧ [[ψ ]])↑)
V (ϕ ∨ψ) = ((([ϕ ])∧ ([ψ ]))↓,([ϕ ])∧ ([ψ ]))
V (ϕ) = (R
(0)

[([ϕ ])],(R
(0)

[([ϕ ])])↑)
V (^ϕ) = ((R
(0)
^ [[[ϕ ]]])
↓,R
(0)
^ [[[ϕ ]]])
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which in its turn induces α-membership relations for each α ∈A (in symbols: M,a α ϕ), and α-description
relations for each α ∈ A (in symbols: M,x≻α ϕ)—cf. discussion in Section 2.5—such that for every ϕ ∈L ,
M,a α ϕ iff α ≤ [[ϕ ]](a),
M,x≻α ϕ iff α ≤ ([ϕ ])(x).
This can be equivalently expressed by means of the following recursive definition:
M,a α p iff α ≤ [[ϕ ]](a);
M,a α ⊤ iff α ≤ (⊤A
A
)(a) i.e. always;
M,a α ⊥ iff α ≤ (⊤A
X
)↓(a) =
∧
x∈X(⊤
AX (x)→ I(a,x)) =
∧
x∈X I(a,x);
M,a α ϕ ∧ψ iff M,a α ϕ andM,a α ψ;
M,a α ϕ ∨ψ iff α ≤ (([ϕ ])∧ ([ψ ]))↓(a) =
∧
x∈X (([ϕ ])(x)∧ ([ψ ])(x)→ I(a,x));
M,a α ϕ iff α ≤ (R
(0)

[([ϕ ])])(a) =
∧
x∈X (([ϕ ])(x)→ R(a,x));
M,a α ^ϕ iff α ≤ ((R
(0)
^
[[[ϕ ]]])↓)(a) =
∧
x∈X((R
(0)
^
[[[ϕ ]]])(x)→ I(a,x))
M,x≻α p iff α ≤ ([ϕ ])(x);
M,x≻α ⊥ iff α ≤ (⊤A
X
)(x) i.e. always;
M,x≻α ⊤ iff α ≤ (⊤A
A
)↑(x) =
∧
a∈A(⊤
AA(a)→ I(a,x)) =
∧
a∈A I(a,x);
M,x≻α ϕ ∨ψ iff M,x≻α ϕ andM,x≻α ψ;
M,x≻α ϕ ∧ψ iff α ≤ ([[ϕ ]]∧ [[ψ ]])↑(x) =
∧
a∈A([[ϕ ]](a)∧ [[ψ ]](a)→ I(a,x));
M,x≻α ^ϕ iff α ≤ (R
(0)
^
[[[ϕ ]]])(x) =
∧
a∈A([[ϕ ]](a)→ R^(x,a));
M,x≻α ϕ iff α ≤ ((R
(0)

[([ϕ ])])↑)(x) =
∧
a∈A((R
(0)

[([ϕ ])])(a)→ I(a,x))
Axiomatic characterization of reflexive enriched formal A-contexts. With the definition above in place,
we are now in a position to show, as an illustration, that the characterization of reflexivity of Proposition 5
extends to the many-valued setting.
Proposition 9. For any enriched formal A-context F= (P,R,R^),
F |= ϕ ⊢ ϕ iff R ≤ I.
Proof. It is sufficient to establish that the following are equivalent in F+:
∀p[p≤ p]
iff ∀m[m≤m] (ALBA algorithm [15])
iff ∀α∀x[R
(0)

[{α/x}↓↑]≤ {α/x}↓] (m := {α/x})
iff ∀α∀x[R
(0)

[{α/x}]≤ {α/x}↓] (I-compatibility of R)
iff ∀α∀x∀a[α → aRx≤ α → aIx] (∗)
iff R ≤ I (∗∗)
To justify the equivalence to (∗) we note that R
(0)

[{α/x}](a) =
∧
y∈X({α/x}(y)→ aRy) = {α/x}(x)→
aRx = α → aRx and that {α/x}
↓(a) =
∧
y∈X ({α/x}(y)→ aIy) = {α/x}(x)→ aIx = α → aIx. For the
equivalence to (∗∗) note that choosing α = aRx in (∗) yields ⊤
A ≤ aRx→ aIx which, by residuation, is
equivalent to (∗∗). The converse direction is immediate by the monotonicity of→ in the second coordinate.

Lifting other relevant properties such as transitivity, in the way just illustrated by the example of reflexiv-
ity, leads to the definition of many-valued conceptual approximation spaces. We will develop this theory in a
dedicated paper.
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7.3 Dempster-Shafer theory on conceptual approximation spaces
Dempster-Shafer theory [27, 69] is a mathematical framework for decision-making under uncertainty in situ-
ations in which some predicates cannot be assigned subjective probabilities. In such cases, Dempster-Shafer
theory proposes to replace the missing value with a range of values, the lower and upper bounds of which
are assigned by belief and plausibility functions (the definitions of which are reported below). The affinity
between Dempster-Shafer theory and rough set theory has been noticed very early on [62]; systematic con-
nections are established in [79], and a logical account of Dempster-Shafer’s theory was developed in [36].
In this section, we lay the groundwork for the possibility of using conceptual approximation spaces as the
basic structures for developing a Dempster-Shafer theory of concepts. Towards this goal, we first show how
(probabilistic) approximation spaces arise in connection with finite probability spaces, and then use a suitably
modified version of the lifting construction on probabilistic approximation spaces to propose a polarity-based
generalization of probability spaces in which the basic notions of Dempster-Shafer’s theory can be general-
ized from predicates to concepts.
Belief and plausibility functions. Recall that a belief function on a set S is a map bel : P(S)→ [0,1] such
that bel(S) = 1, and for all n ∈ N,
bel(A1∪·· ·∪An) ≥ ∑ /0,I⊆1,...,n(−1)
|I|+1bel(
⋂
i∈I Ai) ,
and a plausibility function on S is a map pl : P(S)→ [0,1] such that pl(S) = 1, and for every n ∈ N,
pl(A1∪A2∪ ...∪An) ≤ ∑ /0,I⊆1,2,...,n(−1)
|I|+1bel(
⋂
i∈I Ai) .
For every belief function bel as above, the assignment X 7→ 1− bel(X) defines a plausibility function on S,
and for every plausibility function pl as above, the assignment X 7→ 1−pl(X) defines a belief function on S.
Probability spaces. Prime examples of belief and plausibility functions arise from probability spaces. A
probability space is a structure X = (S,A,µ) where S is a nonempty (finite) set, A is a σ -algebra of subsets
of S, and µ : A→ [0,1] is a countably additive probability measure. Let e : A ֒→ P(S) denote the natural
embedding of A into the powerset algebra of S. Any µ as above induces the inner and outer measures
µ∗,µ
∗ : P(S)→ [0,1], respectively defined as
µ∗(Z) := sup{µ(b) | b ∈ A and e(b)⊆ Z} and µ
∗(Z) := inf{µ(b) | b ∈A and Z ⊆ e(b)}.
By construction, µ∗(e(b)) = µ(b) = µ
∗(e(b)) for every b ∈ A and µ∗(Z) = 1− µ∗(Z) for every Z ⊆ S.
Moreover, for every probability space X= (S,A,µ), the inner (resp. outer) measure induced by µ is a belief
(resp. plausibility) function on S (cf. [28, Proposition 3.1]).
As observed in [33, Section 2], in a finite probability space X= (S,A,µ), the natural embedding e :A ֒→
P(S) is a complete lattice homomorphism (in fact it is a complete Boolean algebra homomorphism, but in the
context of Boolean algebras, these two notions collapse). Hence, the right and left adjoints of e exist, denoted
ι,γ : P(S)։A respectively, and defined as ι(Y ) :=
⋃
{a ∈A | e(a)⊆ Y} and γ(Y ) :=
⋂
{a ∈A | Y ⊆ e(a)}.
Notice that by construction and the fact that e is injective, ι(∅) :=
⋃
{a ∈ A | e(a)⊆ ∅} =
⋃
{⊥} = ⊥, and
γ(S) :=
⋂
{a ∈A | S ⊆ e(a)}=
⋂
{⊤}=⊤.
Lemma 18. (cf. [33, Lemma 2.1]) For every finite probability space X= (S,A,µ), and every Y ∈P(S),
µ∗(Y ) = µ(ι(Y )) and µ
∗(Y ) = µ(γ(Y )).
Proof. We only show the first identity. By definition,
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µ∗(Y ) =
∨
{µ(a) | a ∈ A and e(a)⊆ Y}
= µ(
⋃
{a | a ∈A and e(a)⊆ Y}) (µ is additive)
= µ(ι(Y )). (def. of ι)

Fromprobability spaces to approximation spaces. Consider the operations,^ :P(S)→P(S), defined
as Y := e(ι(Y )) and ^Y := e(γ(Y )). The next lemma shows how finite approximation spaces arise from
finite probability spaces.
Lemma 19. For every finite probability space X= (S,A,µ), the operations  and ^ defined above:
1. are complete normal modal operators;
2. are S4 operators (i.e.  is an interior operator and ^ is a closure operator on P(S));
3. are adjoint to each other, i.e. ^Y ⊆ Z iff Y ⊆ Z for all Y,Z ∈P(S);
4. are S5 operators;
5. are dual to each other, i.e. Y = ¬^¬Y for all Y ∈P(X);
6. can be respectively identified with the semantic box and diamond operators arising from the relation
R⊆ S× S defined as R(x,y) iff x ∈^{y};8
7. the relation R defined above is an equivalence relation.
Proof. 1. immediately follows from the definitions, and e preserving both complete joins and meets; 2.
Y ⊆Y (resp.Y ⊆^Y ) readily follows from the definition of ι (resp. γ); Y ⊆Y (resp.^^Y ⊆^Y ) readily
follows from the definitions of  and ^, and eιe= e (resp. eγe= e); 3. follows from the definitions of  and
^, and γ ⊣ e ⊣ ι; 4. by adjunction, ^Y ⊆ ^Y iff Y ⊆ ^Y and Y ⊆ Y iff ^Y ⊆ Y , as required; 5. since e
is an injective Boolean homomorphism, to prove eι(Y ) = ¬eγ(¬Y ) it is enough to show ι(Y ) = ¬γ(¬Y ).
¬γ(¬Y ) = ¬
⋂
{a ∈A | ¬Y ⊆ e(a)} (def. of γ)
=
⋃
{¬a ∈ A | ¬Y ⊆ e(a)} (De Morgan)
=
⋃
{¬a ∈ A | ¬e(a)⊆Y} (¬ self adj.)
=
⋃
{¬a ∈ A | e(¬a)⊆Y} (e BA-hom.)
=
⋃
{b ∈ A | e(b)⊆ Y} (¬ surjective)
= ι(Y ). (def. of ι)
6. By 5. it is enough to show that 〈R〉Y = ^Y for every Y ∈ P(S). Recall that ^ = eγ is completely⋃
-preserving, cf. item 1 of this lemma. Hence:
〈R〉Y = R−1[Y ]
= {x ∈ X | xRy for some y ∈Y}
= {x ∈ X | x ∈ ^{y} for some y ∈ Y}
=
⋃
{^{y} | y ∈ Y}
= ^(
⋃
{{y} | y ∈ Y})
= ^Y .
8Equivalently, y is an R-successor of x iff x is in the closure of y.
37
7. By item 2, the inclusions Y ⊆ ^Y and ^^Y ⊆ ^Y hold for every Y ∈P(S), and by item 5, ^ = 〈R〉 and
= [R]. Hence, the reflexivity and transitivity of R, i.e. x ∈ R−1[x] and R−1[R−1[x]]⊆ R−1[x] for every x ∈ S,
can be rewritten as {x} ⊆ ^{x} and ^^{x} ⊆ ^{x} respectively, and immediately follow by instantiating
the inclusions above to Y := {x}; symmetry, i.e. R−1[x] = R[x] for every x ∈ S, follows from  and ^ being
adjoint to each other (cf. item 3) and  = [R] (cf. item 6), which imply that ^ = 〈R−1〉. Hence, R−1[x] =
^{x}= 〈R−1〉{x}= R[x], as required. 
Definition 23. A (finite) probabilistic S5-Kripke frame is a triple K = (S,A,R,µ) such that (S,A,µ) is a
(finite) probability space, and R ⊆ S× S is an equivalence relation which is compatible with A, i.e. letting
〈R〉 :P(S)→P(S) denote the semantic diamond induced by R, then 〈R〉= e◦ γ ′ for some γ ′ :P(S)→A. A
(finite) probabilistic S5-Kripke model9 is a tupleM= (K,V ) such that K is a (finite) probabilistic S5-Kripke
frame, and V : Prop→P(S) is a valuation.
Definition 24. If X = (S,A,µ) is a finite probability space, let KX := (S,A,R,µ), where R ⊆ S× S is as in
Lemma 19.6.
Lemma 19 immediately implies that KX is a finite probabilistic S5-Kripke frame.
Lemma 20. For any finite probability space X = (S,A,µ), the relation R defined as in Lemma 19.6 is the
finest equivalence relation compatible with A.
Proof. Let R′ ⊆ S× S be compatible with A. By assumption, ^′ = 〈R′〉 = e ◦ γ ′ for some γ ′ : P(S)→ A.
Since R′ is reflexive, Y ⊆ ^′Y = e ◦ γ ′(Y ). Hence by adjunction, γ(Y ) ⊆ γ ′(Y ) for every Y ∈ A. Hence, if
Y := {y}, this yields xRy iff x∈^{y}= e◦γ({y})⊆ e◦γ ′({y}) =^′{y} iff xR′y for every x∈ S, which shows
that R⊆ R′, as required. 
Summing up, every finite probability space X = (S,A,µ) can be endowed with a structure of approxi-
mation space by means of an indiscernibility relation on S which is ‘canonical’, in the sense that it is the
most informative equivalence relation which is compatible with A. Conversely, as is well known, for every
(finite) approximation space X = (S,R), the Boolean subalgebra A of P(S) generated by taking unions of
the equivalence blocks of the equivalence relation R is a σ -algebra of subsets of S, and hence approximation
spaces can be regarded as the (purely qualitative) bases of finite probability spaces.
Generalizing to conceptual probability spaces. The lifting methodology discussed in the previous sec-
tions provides the motivation for the following
Definition 25. (cf. [33, Definition 3.3]) A conceptual probability space is a structure S = (P,A,µ) where
P=(A,X , I) is a finite polarity10,A is a σ -algebra of formal concepts of P, i.e. a lattice embedding e :A ֒→ P+
exists, and µ :A→ [0,1] is a (countably additive) probability measure.
Like in the case of probability spaces, conceptual probability spaces can be endowed with the structure of
conceptual approximation spaces. Indeed, since A and P+ are finite lattices, the lattice embedding e : A ֒→
P+ has both its right and left adjoint ι,γ : P+ ։ A which are defined as ι(c) :=
∨
{a ∈ A | e(a) ≤ c} and
γ(c) :=
∧
{a ∈ A | c≤ e(a)}.
Notice that by construction and the fact that e is injective, ι(⊥P
+
) :=
∨
{a∈A | e(a)≤⊥P
+
}=
∨
{⊥A}=
⊥A, and γ(⊤P
+
) :=
∧
{a∈A | ⊤P
+
≤ e(a)}=
∧
{⊤A}=⊤A. Let ,^ : P+→ P+ be defined as c := e(ι(c))
and ^c := e(γ(c)). In what follows, we let a= (a↑↓,a↑) and x= (x↓,x↓↑) for any a ∈ A and x ∈ X .
9Probabilistic S5-Kripke models are also known in the literature as total -probabilistic Kripke models (cf. [36, Section 2]). In order
to be coherent with the literature in modal logic, we refer to semantic structures without valuations of propositional formulas as ‘frames’
and to those with valuations as ‘models’. Hence, we will also refer to the probability structures of [28] (i.e. tuplesM := (X,V ) such that
X is a probability space and V : Prop →P(S) a valuation) as probability models.
10A polarity P is finite if its associated concept lattice P+ is finite.
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Lemma 21. For any finite conceptual probability space S= (P,A,µ), the operations and^ defined above:
1. are complete normal modal operators;
2. are S4 operators (i.e.  is an interior operator and ^ is a closure operator on P+);
3. are adjoint to each other, i.e. ^c≤ d iff c≤ d for all c,d ∈ P+;
4. are S5 operators;
5. can be respectively identified with [R] and 〈R−1〉 for the I-compatible relation R ⊆ A×X defined as
R(a,x) iff a≤ x ;
6. the relation R defined above is such that R⊆ I and R⊆ R ; R.
Proof. Items 1-4 are verified analogously to the corresponding items of Lemma 19; their proofs are omitted.
5. By construction, R(0)[x] = {a | aRx} = {a | a ≤ x} = [[x]] which is Galois-stable for every x ∈ X .
Likewise, by item 3, R(1)[a] = {x | aRx} = {x | a ≤ x} = {x | ^a ≤ x} = ([^a]) which is Galois-stable for
every a ∈ A. This finishes the proof that R is I-compatible. As to the remaining part of the statement, by item
3, and since adjoints uniquely determine each other, it is enough to show that c= [R]c for every c ∈ P+, and
since they are both finitely (i.e. in this case, completely) meet-preserving and P+ is meet-generated by the set
{x | x ∈ X}, it is enough to show that [[x]] = [[[R]x]] for any x ∈ X .
[[[R]x]] = R(0)[x↓↑]
= {a ∈ A | ∀y(y ∈ x↓↑⇒ aRy)}
= {a ∈ A | ∀y(([y])⊆ ([x])⇒ a≤ y)}
= {a ∈ A | ∀y(x≤ y⇒ a≤ y)}
= {a ∈ A | a≤ x}
= [[x]].
6. By adjunction, ι(c)≤ ι(c) implies that c= eι(c)≤ c for any c ∈ P+, and hence if aRx then a≤ x≤ x,
i.e. aIx, which proves that R⊆ I. By adjunction, eιe(a) = e(a) for every a∈A, hence c= eι(c) = eιeι(c) =
c for any c ∈ P+, therefore aRx iff a ≤ x = x, i.e. a ≤ y for every y ∈ X such that x ≤ y, i.e. aRy
for every y ∈ ([x]). By definition, a(R ; R)x iff aRy for every y ∈ (R(0)[x])↑ = ([x]). Indeed,
(R(0)[x])↑ = {y | ∀b(b ∈ R(0)[x]⇒ bIy)}
= {y | ∀b(bRx⇒ bIy)}
= {y | ∀b(b≤ x⇒ b≤ y)}
= {y | x≤ y}
= ([x]).

The facts shown in this section motivate the idea that the systematic connections between rough set theory
and Dempster-Shafer theory can be extended to the formal environment of rough concepts. Some steps in
this direction have already been taken in [33], but even more can be done (see discussion in Section 8).
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8 Conclusions and further directions
The lifting methodology as a defining tool. In the present paper, we have considered a construction (the
lifting of Kripke frames to enriched formal contexts) and formulated it as the solution to a category-theoretic
requirement (i.e. the commutativity of the diagram of Section 1) which naturally arises from duality-theoretic
insights (namely, that each Kripke frame and enriched formal context has an algebraic representation in the
form of its associated complex algebra). We have shown that the lifting construction ‘restricts well’ (i.e.mod-
ularly) to subclasses of Kripke frames and enriched formal contexts defined by a number of conditions—
including reflexivity and transitivity—which are both natural and very relevant to Rough Set Theory; in
particular, each of these conditions can be considered independently of the others, and the commutativity of
the diagram is preserved for each resulting restricted class. The modularity of these restrictions is not only
mathematically elegant but has also a logical import: via an application of unified correspondence theory,
the conditions we have considered can be characterized in terms of the validity of certain logical axioms
(cf. Proposition 5), and the commutativity of the diagram in each restricted subclass implies that the logical
axioms are preserved by the lifting construction from Kripke frames to enriched formal contexts.
The lifting construction and its mathematical and logical properties have provided us with a principled
ground to propose conceptual approximation spaces (cf. Definition 8), as the FCA counterparts of approx-
imation spaces, thus obtaining a unifying formal environment for RST and FCA in which to formalize and
reason about rough concepts.
Being more general, this environment allows for a wider range of variations. In particular, the notions of
conceptual co-approximation spaces and bi-approximation spaces naturally arise from the lifting methodol-
ogy, and interestingly subsume established approaches in the literature on the unification of RST and FCA,
such as Kent’s Rough Concept Analysis [46].
Finally, in Section 7, we have applied the lifting methodology to three theories which, although from
various motivations and starting points, are all related to rough set theory in that they aim at accounting for
the vagueness of predicates, their gradedness, and reasoning under uncertainty in situations in which not all
events can be assigned a probability. Precisely the fact that these theories are so different and differently
motivated is significant evidence of the robustness of the lifting methodology.
From the viewpoint of logic, these results contribute a novel intuitive understanding of the modal logic
of categories and concepts discussed in Section 2.5, and specifically show that the epistemic interpretation
proposed in [17, 13] is one among many possible interpretations. Hence, these results witness the potential
of this logical framework as a flexible and powerful tool to address categorical reasoning in a wide range of
fields intersecting and involving information sciences. Mathematically, these results pave the way to several
research directions, including those we discuss below.
Lifting construction and Sahlqvist theory. Proposition 5 characterizes the validity of well known modal
axioms, such as those classically corresponding to reflexivity and transitivity, on enriched formal contexts
in terms of the ‘lifted versions’ of these conditions (cf. Proposition 3 and Definition 7). We think of this
phenomenon as stability under lifting. This suggests that this phenomenon might apply to wider classes of
modal axioms, such as the Sahlqvist and inductive inequalities (cf. [15, Definitions 3.4 and 3.5]). Formulating
and proving such a general result would provide a more systematic perspective on this phenomenon, and
would illuminate the relationship between Sahlqvist correspondence theory in the classical (i.e. Boolean)
setting and Sahlqvist correspondence theory in the lattice-based setting from yet another angle.
Lifting construction and the Goldblatt-Thomason theorem on enriched formal contexts. Closely re-
lated to the previous question is the question concerning the nature of the relation between stability under
lifting and the characterization of modal definability on enriched formal contexts given in [23]. This is the
object of ongoing investigation for some of the authors.
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Complete axiomatization for the logic of rough formal contexts. An open issue concerning the class of
Kent’s rough formal contexts (cf. Sections 5.6 and 5.7) is to find a complete axiomatization for its naturally
associated modal logic. A key step towards this goal is to verify, by means of the characterization of [23],
whether the first-order conditions expressing the relationship between E and the approximations R and S
arising from E are modally definable. This issue is addressed in [23].
Conceptual T-models. In Section 7.1, we have used the lifting methodology to illustrate how the semantic
framework of [9] can be generalized from vague predicates to vague concepts, and have shown how concep-
tual counterparts of the sorites paradox can be accounted for in this framework. These results set the stage
for a systematic investigation of vague concepts, making use of insights and results from formal philosophy
and semantics of natural language.
Many-valued conceptual approximation spaces. In Section 7.2, we have adapted the lifting methodology
to the setting of many-valued Kripke frames, and used it to define a semantic framework for the many-valued
logic of categories and concepts, which is suitable to describe and reason about e.g. ‘to which extent’ a given
object is a member of a certain category and ‘to which extent’ a given feature describes a category. This setting
is especially suited to provide formal models of core situations and phenomena studied in areas of business
science such as strategy, marketing and entrepreneurship and innovation. One such phenomenon is category-
spanning (i.e. the extent to which a market-product belongs to more than one product-category), the impact
of which on the perception and evaluation of consumers has been recognized as a key predictor of the success
of products in markets [41, 58, 61]. Another key predictor is the extent to which certain core features can
be attributed to market-products, which function as a value-anchor for objects evaluated as members of new
emerging categories [48]. Future research also concerns using the many-valued setting for understanding the
nature and sources of graded membership, for instance by modelling situations in which graded membership
can be considered to result from the presence of multiple competing classification systems in one domain
[76] or different audiences attaching different category labels to the same objects [49].
Towards a Dempster-Shafer theory of concepts. In Section 7.3, we show that the systematic connections
between the mathematical environments of Dempster-Shafer theory and of rough set theory can be extended,
via lifting, from set-based structures to polarity-based structures. This paves the way for the development
of a Dempster-Shafer theory of concepts. Preliminary steps in this direction have been taken in [33], where,
however, the connection with a modal/epistemic logic approach to Dempster-Shafer theory is not yet devel-
oped. The results of Section 7.3 set the stage for the development of an epistemic-logical approach to the
Dempster-Shafer theory of concepts generalizing the approach of [36, 66].
Conceptual rough algebras and proof calculi. The links between rough set theory and proof theory are
mainly mediated by the theory of the varieties of algebras introduced in connection with approximation
spaces. In [68], sequent calculi which are sound and complete but without cut elimination are defined for the
logics naturally associated with the classes of algebras discussed in [67]. Sequent calculi with cut elimination
and a non-standard version of subformula property have been introduced in [54] for some but not all of these
logics. These difficulties are overcome in [39], where a family of calculi with standard cut elimination and
subformula property are introduced for the logics of the classes of algebras discussed in [67], and with the
same methodology, in [38], a family of calculi endowed with comparable properties is introduced for varieties
of lattice-based modal algebras which can be thought of as the counterparts of the algebras of [67] for the
setting of Kent’s rough formal concepts [46]. Further directions of this line of research will be developing
complete axiomatizations and proof calculi for the logics discussed in the previous paragraphs and for the
dynamic and many-valued logics discussed below.
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Polarity-based semantics and graph-based semantics. In the first paragraph of this section we remarked
that the formal environment of rough concepts provides a new sets of interpretations for the lattice-based
modal logic of Section 2.5. Several other interpretations for the same logic are proposed in [12, 11, 21], based
on a different but related semantics (referred to as graph-based semantics) which is grounded on Plosˇcˇica’s
duality and representation theory for bounded lattices [65], (see also [25, 24]). Inspired by the rough set
theory approach, the relation E in the graphs (Z,E) on which the graph-based models are based is interpreted
as an indiscernibility relation. However, instead of using E to generate modal operators, E is used to generate
a complete lattice via the polarity (Z,Z,Ec) (in the many-valued setting, via the A-polarity (Z,A×Z, IE)).
An interesting feature of E is that it is assumed to be reflexive but not transitive nor symmetric. This agrees
with what many researchers in the rough set theory community have advocated [78, 82, 79, 74].
Towards modelling categorical dynamics. Conceptual approximation spaces are a natural starting point
to model how categorization systems change. This is a core issue in a wide range of disciplines which include
computational linguistics and information retrieval (for tracking the change in the meaning of lexical terms
[53]), AI (e.g. for modelling how clusters are generated by machine learning clustering algorithms [35]),
social and cognitive sciences (e.g. for modelling cognitive and social development of individuals [40]), and
management science (to analyze market dynamics in terms of the evolution of categories of products and
producers [64]). This is presently ongoing work, based on a suitable generalization of the techniques and
results on dynamic updates on algebras developed in [55, 50, 18, 19].
References
[1] Mohua Banerjee and Mihir K Chakraborty. Rough sets through algebraic logic. Fundamenta Informat-
icae, 28(3, 4):211–221, 1996.
[2] Radim Beˆlohla´vek. Fuzzy galois connections. Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 45(4):497–504, 1999.
[3] M Jose´ Benı´tez-Caballero, Jesu´s Medina, and Eloı´sa Ramı´rez-Poussa. Unifying reducts in formal con-
cept analysis and rough set theory. In Trends in Mathematics and Computational Intelligence, pages
89–95. Springer, 2019.
[4] Fe´lix Bou, Francesc Esteva, Lluı´s Godo, and Ricardo Oscar Rodrı´guez. On the minimum many-valued
modal logic over a finite residuated lattice. Journal of Logic and computation, 21(5):739–790, 2011.
[5] Cecelia Britz. Correspondence theory in many-valued modal logics. Master’s thesis, University of
Johannesburg, South Africa, 2016.
[6] Richmond Campbell. The sorites paradox. Philosophical Studies, 26(3-4):175–191, 1974.
[7] Gianpiero Cattaneo, Giampiero Chiaselotti, Davide Ciucci, and Tommaso Gentile. On the connection
of hypergraph theory with formal concept analysis and rough set theory. Information Sciences, 330:342
– 357, 2016. SI Visual Info Communication.
[8] Davide Ciucci, Didier Dubois, and Henri Prade. The structure of oppositions in rough set theory and
formal concept analysis-toward a new bridge between the two settings. In International Symposium on
Foundations of Information and Knowledge Systems, pages 154–173. Springer, 2014.
[9] Pablo Cobreros, Paul Egre´, David Ripley, and Robert van Rooij. Tolerant, classical, strict. Journal of
Philosophical Logic, 41(2):347–385, 2012.
42
[10] Stephen D Comer. Perfect extensions of regular double stone algebras. Algebra Universalis, 34(1):96–
109, 1995.
[11] W. Conradie, A. Craig, A. Palmigiano, and N. Wijnberg. Modelling competing theories. In
Proc. EUSFLAT 2019, Atlantis Studies in Uncertainty Modelling, page forthcoming, 2019.
[12] W. Conradie, A. Craig, A. Palmigiano, and N.M Wijnberg. Modelling informational entropy. In
Proc. WoLLIC 2019, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, page forthcoming. Springer, 2019.
[13] W. Conradie, S. Frittella, A. Palmigiano, M. Piazzai, A. Tzimoulis, and N.M. Wijnberg. Toward an
epistemic-logical theory of categorization. In 16th conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality
and Knowledge (TARK 2017), volume 251 of Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science,
pages 170–189, 2017.
[14] W. Conradie and A. Palmigiano. Constructive canonicity of inductive inequalities. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1603.08341, 2016.
[15] W. Conradie and A. Palmigiano. Algorithmic correspondence and canonicity for non-distributive logics.
Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, page DOI: 10.1016/j.apal.2019.04.003, 2019.
[16] Willem Conradie, Andrew Craig, Alessandra Palmigiano, and Zhiguang Zhao. Constructive canonicity
for lattice-based fixed point logics. In Proc. WoLLIC 2017, volume 10388 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 92–109. Springer, 2017. ArXiv preprint arXiv:1603.06547.
[17] Willem Conradie, Sabine Frittella, Alessandra Palmigiano, Michele Piazzai, Apostolos Tzimoulis, and
Nachoem M Wijnberg. Categories: how i learned to stop worrying and love two sorts. In International
Workshop on Logic, Language, Information, and Computation, pages 145–164. Springer, 2016.
[18] Willem Conradie, Sabine Frittella, Alessandra Palmigiano, and Apostolos Tzimoulis. Probabilistic
epistemic updates on algebras. In International Workshop on Logic, Rationality and Interaction, pages
64–76. Springer, 2015.
[19] Willem Conradie, Sabine Frittella, Alessandra Palmigiano, Apostolos Tzimoulis, and Nachoem Wijn-
berg. Probabilistic epistemic updates on algebras. Transaction on Computational Logic, 2019.Forth-
coming. arXiv preprint arXiv:1612.05267.
[20] Willem Conradie, Silvio Ghilardi, and Alessandra Palmigiano. Unified Correspondence. In Alexandru
Baltag and Sonja Smets, editors, Johan van Benthem on Logic and Information Dynamics, volume 5 of
Outstanding Contributions to Logic, pages 933–975. Springer International Publishing, 2014.
[21] Willem Conradie, Alessandra Palmigiano, Claudette Robinson, Apostolos Tzimoulis, and Nachoem
Wijnberg. Modelling socio-political competition. Submitted, 2019.
[22] Willem Conradie, Alessandra Palmigiano, and Sumit Sourabh. Algebraic modal correspondence:
Sahlqvist and beyond. Journal of Logical and Algebraic Methods in Programming, 91:60–84, 2017.
[23] Willem Conradie, Alessandra Palmigiano, and Apostolos Tzimoulis. Goldblatt-Thomason for LE-
logics. arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.08225, 2018.
[24] A. Craig, M. Gouveia, and M. Haviar. TiRS graphs and TiRS frames: a new setting for duals of
canonical extensions. Algebra universalis, 74(1-2):123–138, 2015.
[25] A. Craig, M. Haviar, and H. Priestley. A fresh perspective on canonical extensions for bounded lattices.
Applied Categorical Structures, 21(6):725–749, 2013.
43
[26] B. Davey and H. Priestley. Introduction to lattices and order. Cambridge univ. press, 2002.
[27] Arthur P Dempster. A generalization of bayesian inference. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society:
Series B (Methodological), 30(2):205–232, 1968.
[28] Ronald Fagin and Joseph Y Halpern. Uncertainty, belief, and probability. Computational Intelligence,
7(3):160–173, 1991.
[29] Melvin Fitting. Many-valued modal logics. Fundam. Inform., 15(3-4):235–254, 1991.
[30] Melvin Fitting. Many-valued model logics ii. Fundam. Inform., 17(1-2):55–73, 1992.
[31] A Formica. Integrating fuzzy formal concept analysis and rough set theory for the semantic web. Bul-
letin of Computational Applied Mathematics, 6(2), 2018.
[32] S. Frankowski. Definable Classes of Many-Valued Kripke Frames. Bulletin of the Section of Logic,
35:27 – 36, 2006.
[33] S. Frittella, K. Manoorkar, A. Palmigiano, A. Tzimoulis, and N.M. Wijnberg. Towards a Dempster-
Shafer theory of concepts. Submitted, 2019.
[34] Bernhard Ganter and Rudolf Wille. Formal concept analysis: mathematical foundations. Springer
Science & Business Media, 2012.
[35] David Gibson, Jon Kleinberg, and Prabhakar Raghavan. Clustering categorical data: An approach based
on dynamical systems. Databases, 1:75, 1998.
[36] Lluı´s Godo, Petr Ha´jek, and Francesc Esteva. A fuzzy modal logic for belief functions. Fundamenta
Informaticae, 57(2-4):127–146, 2003.
[37] Giuseppe Greco, Peter Jipsen, Fei Liang, Alessandra Palmigiano, and Apostolos Tzimoulis. Algebraic
proof theory for LE-logics. arXiv preprint arXiv:1808.04642, 2018.
[38] Giuseppe Greco, Peter Jipsen, Krishna Manoorkar, Alessandra Palmigiano, and Apostolos Tzimoulis.
Logics for rough concept analysis. In Indian Conference on Logic and Its Applications, pages 144–159.
Springer, 2019.
[39] Giuseppe Greco, Fei Liang, Krishna Manoorkar, and Alessandra Palmigiano. Proper multi-type display
calculi for rough algebras. In Post-proceedings LSFA 2018, ENTCS, 2018.
[40] Lawrence A Hirschfeld. On acquiring social categories: cognitive development and anthropological
wisdom. Man, pages 611–638, 1988.
[41] Greta Hsu, Michael T Hannan, and Ozgecan Kocak. Multiple category memberships in markets: An
integrative theory and two empirical tests. American Sociological Review, 74(1):150–169, 2009.
[42] Mengjun Hu and Yiyu Yao. Structured approximations as a basis for three-way decisions in rough set
theory. Knowledge-Based Systems, 165:92–109, 2019.
[43] Tadeusz B Iwinski. Algebraic approach to rough sets. Bull. Pol. Acd. Sci., Math., 35:673–683, 1987.
[44] Xiangping Kang, Deyu Li, Suge Wang, and Kaishe Qu. Rough set model based on formal concept
analysis. Information Sciences, 222:611 – 625, 2013. Including Special Section on New Trends in
Ambient Intelligence and Bio-inspired Systems.
44
[45] Xiangping Kang, Deyu Li, Suge Wang, and Kaishe Qu. Rough set model based on formal concept
analysis. Information Sciences, 222:611–625, 2013.
[46] Robert E Kent. Rough concept analysis: a synthesis of rough sets and formal concept analysis. Funda-
menta Informaticae, 27(2, 3):169–181, 1996.
[47] Robert E Kent. Soft concept analysis. arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.09036, 2018.
[48] B. Kuijken, G. Gemser, and N. M. Wijnberg. Categorization and willingness to pay for new products:
The role of category cues as value anchors. Journal of Product InnovationManagement, 34(6):757–771,
2017.
[49] Bram Kuijken, Mark AAM Leenders, Nachoem M Wijnberg, and Gerda Gemser. The producer-
consumer classification gap and its effects on music festival success. European Journal of Marketing,
50(9/10):1726–1745, 2016.
[50] Alexander Kurz and Alessandra Palmigiano. Epistemic updates on algebras. Logical Methods in Com-
puter Science (LMCS), 9(4), 2013.
[51] Le´onard Kwuida. Dicomplemented lattices. PhD dissertation, Dresden University of Technology, 2004.
[52] Hongliang Lai and Dexue Zhang. Concept lattices of fuzzy contexts: Formal concept analysis vs. rough
set theory. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 50(5):695–707, 2009.
[53] Robert Liebscher and R Belew. Lexical dynamics and conceptual change: Analyses and implications
for information retrieval. Cognitive Science Online, 1(2):46–57, 2003.
[54] Minghui Ma, Mihir Kumar Chakraborty, and Zhe Lin. Sequent calculi for varieties of topological quasi-
boolean algebras. In International Joint Conference on Rough Sets, pages 309–322. Springer, 2018.
[55] Minghui Ma, Alessandra Palmigiano, and Mehrnoosh Sadrzadeh. Algebraic semantics and model com-
pleteness for intuitionistic public announcement logic. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 165(4):963–
995, 2014.
[56] Xi-Ao Ma and Yiyu Yao. Min-max attribute-object bireducts: On unifying models of reducts in rough
set theory. Information Sciences, 501:68–83, 2019.
[57] MA Moshier. A relational category of formal contexts. Preprint, 2016.
[58] Giacomo Negro and Ming D Leung. “actual” and perceptual effects of category spanning. Organization
Science, 24(3):684–696, 2013.
[59] Ewa Orlowska. Rough set semantics for non-classical logics. In Rough Sets, Fuzzy Sets and Knowledge
Discovery, pages 143–148. Springer, 1994.
[60] Ewa Orlowska. Incomplete information: Rough set analysis, volume 13. Physica, 2013.
[61] Lionel Paolella and Rodolphe Durand. Category spanning, evaluation, and performance: Revised theory
and test on the corporate law market. Academy of Management Journal, 59(1):330–351, 2016.
[62] Zdzislaw Pawlak. Rough probability. Bull. Pol. Acad. Sci. Math, 32:607–615, 1984.
[63] Zdzislaw Pawlak. Rough set theory and its applications to data analysis. Cybernetics & Systems,
29(7):661–688, 1998.
45
[64] Michele Piazzai and Nachoem M Wijnberg. Product proliferation, complexity, and deterrence to imita-
tion in differentiated-product oligopolies. Strategic Management Journal, 40(6):945–958, 2019.
[65] M. Plosˇcˇica. A natural representation of bounded lattices. Tatra Mountains Mathematical Publications,
4, 1994.
[66] Enrique H Ruspini. The logical foundations of evidential reasoning. SRI International Menlo Park, CA,
1986.
[67] Anirban Saha, Jayanta Sen, and Mihir Kumar Chakraborty. Algebraic structures in the vicinity of pre-
rough algebra and their logics. Information Sciences, 282:296–320, 2014.
[68] Anirban Saha, Jayanta Sen, and Mihir Kumar Chakraborty. Algebraic structures in the vicinity of pre-
rough algebra and their logics ii. Information Sciences, 333:44–60, 2016.
[69] Glenn Shafer. A mathematical theory of evidence, volume 42. Princeton university press, 1976.
[70] Ming-Wen Shao, Li Guo, and Chang-Zhong Wang. Connections between two-universe rough sets and
formal concepts. International Journal of Machine Learning and Cybernetics, 9(11):1869–1877, 2018.
[71] Jhieh-Yu Shyng, How-Ming Shieh, and Gwo-Hshiung Tzeng. An integration method combining rough
set theory with formal concept analysis for personal investment portfolios. Knowledge-Based Systems,
23(6):586–597, 2010.
[72] BK Tripathy, DP Acharjya, and V Cynthya. A framework for intelligent medical diagnosis using rough
set with formal concept analysis. arXiv preprint arXiv:1301.6011, 2013.
[73] Dimiter Vakarelov. A modal logic for similarity relations in Pawlak knowledge representation systems.
Fundam. Inform., 15(1):61–79, 1991.
[74] Dimiter Vakarelov. A modal characterization of indiscernibility and similarity relations in pawlaks
information systems. In InternationalWorkshop on Rough Sets, Fuzzy Sets, DataMining, and Granular-
Soft Computing, pages 12–22. Springer, 2005.
[75] Robert Van Rooij et al. Vagueness, tolerance and non-transitive entailment. Manuscript. Available at
http://web.logic.at/lomorevi/vaguebook/rooij.pdf, 2010.
[76] N. M. Wijnberg. Classification systems and selection systems: The risks of radical innovation and
category spanning. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 27(3):297–306, 2011.
[77] Marcin Wolski. Formal concept analysis and rough set theory from the perspective of finite topological
approximations. In Transactions on Rough Sets III, pages 230–243. Springer, 2005.
[78] Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska. On a generalization of approximation space. Bulletin of the Polish
Academy of Sciences. Mathematics, 37(1-6):51–62, 1989.
[79] Y. Y. Yao and P.J. Lingras. Interpretations of belief functions in the theory of rough sets. Information
sciences, 104(1-2):81–106, 1998.
[80] Yiyu Yao. A comparative study of formal concept analysis and rough set theory in data analysis. In
International Conference on Rough Sets and Current Trends in Computing, pages 59–68. Springer,
2004.
46
[81] Yiyu Yao. Rough-set concept analysis: Interpreting rs-definable concepts based on ideas from formal
concept analysis. Information Sciences, 346-347:442 – 462, 2016.
[82] YY Yao and Tsau Young Lin. Generalization of rough sets using modal logics. Intelligent Automation
& Soft Computing, 2(2):103–119, 1996.
[83] Huiying Yu, Qingguo Li, and Mingjie Cai. Characteristics of three-way concept lattices and three-way
rough concept lattices. Knowledge-Based Systems, 146:181–189, 2018.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 5
2.
∀p [p≤ p]
iff ∀p∀ j∀m[( j ≤ p & p≤ m)⇒ j ≤ m] first approximation
iff ∀ j∀m[ j ≤ m⇒ j ≤ m] Ackermann’s Lemma
iff ∀m[m≤ m] J c. join-generates F+
i.e ∀x ∈ X R
(0)

[x↓↑]⊆ I(0)[x] translation
iff ∀x ∈ X R
(0)

[x]⊆ I(0)[x] Lemma 2 since R is I-compatible
iff R ⊆ I. By definition
3.
∀p [p≤ ^p]
iff ∀p∀ j∀m[( j ≤ p & ^p≤ m)⇒ j ≤ m] first approximation
iff ∀p∀ j∀m[( j ≤ p & p≤ m)⇒ j ≤ m] adjunction
iff ∀ j∀m[ j ≤ m⇒ j ≤ m] Ackermann’s Lemma
iff ∀m[m≤ m] J c. join-generates F+
i.e ∀x ∈ X R
(0)

[x↓↑]⊆ I(0)[x] translation
iff ∀x ∈ X R
(0)

[x]⊆ I(0)[x] Lemma 2 since R is I-compatible
iff R ⊆ I. By definition
4.
∀p [p≤ p]
iff ∀p∀ j∀m[( j ≤ p & p ≤ m)⇒ j ≤ m] first approximation
iff ∀ j∀m[ j ≤ m⇒ j ≤ m] Ackermann’s Lemma
iff ∀m[m≤ m] J c. join-generates F+
i.e ∀x ∈ X R
(0)

[x↓↑]⊆ R
(0)

[I(1)[R
(0)

[x↓↑]]] translation
iff ∀x ∈ X R
(0)

[x]⊆ R
(0)

[I(1)[R
(0)

[x]]] Lemma 2 since R is I-compatible
iff R ⊆ R;R. By definition
5.
∀p [^^p≤ ^p]
iff ∀p∀ j∀m[( j ≤ p & ^p≤ m)⇒^^ j ≤ m] first approximation
iff ∀ j∀m[^ j ≤ m⇒^^ j ≤ m] Ackermann’s Lemma
iff ∀ j[^^ j ≤ ^ j] M c. meet-generates F+
i.e ∀a ∈ A R
(0)
^
[a↑↓]⊆ R
(0)
^
[I(0)[R
(0)
^
[a↑↓]]] translation
iff ∀a ∈ A R
(0)
^
[a]⊆ R
(0)
^
[I(0)[R
(0)
^
[a]]] Lemma 2 since R^ is I-compatible
iff R^ ⊆ R^;R^. By definition
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6.
∀p [p≤ ^p]
iff ∀p∀ j∀m[( j ≤ p & ^p ≤ m)⇒ j ≤ m] first approximation
iff ∀ j∀m[^ j ≤ m⇒ j ≤ m] Ackermann’s Lemma
iff ∀ j∀m[^ j ≤ m⇒_ j ≤ m] adjunction
iff ∀ j[_ j ≤ ^ j] M c. meet-generates F+
i.e ∀a ∈ A R
(0)
^
[a↑↓]⊆ R
(0)
_
[a↑↓] translation
iff ∀a ∈ A R
(0)
^
[a]⊆ R
(0)
_
[a] Lemma 2 since R^ and R_ are I-compatible
iff R^ ⊆ R_. By definition
7.
∀p [^p≤ p]
iff ∀p∀ j∀m[( j ≤ p & p≤ m)⇒^ j ≤ m] first approximation
iff ∀ j∀m[ j ≤ m⇒^ j ≤ m] Ackermann’s Lemma
iff ∀ j∀m[_ j ≤ m⇒^ j ≤ m] adjunction
iff ∀ j[^ j ≤ _ j] M c. meet-generates F+
i.e ∀a ∈ A R
(0)
_ [a
↑↓]⊆ R
(0)
^ [a
↑↓] translation
iff ∀a ∈ A R
(0)
_ [a]⊆ R
(0)
^ [a] Lemma 2 since R^ and R_ are I-compatible
iff R_ ⊆ R^. By definition
8.
∀p[p≤ p]
iff ∀p∀ j∀m[( j ≤ p & p ≤ m)⇒ j ≤ m] first approximation
iff ∀ j∀m[ j ≤ m⇒ j ≤ m] Ackermann’s Lemma
iff ∀m[m≤ m] J c. join-generates F+
i.e ∀x ∈ X I(0)[x]⊆ R
(0)

[x↓↑] translation
iff ∀x ∈ X I(0)[x]⊆ R
(0)

[x] Lemma 2 since R is I-compatible
iff I ⊆ R. By definition
9.
∀p [^p≤ p]
iff ∀p∀ j∀m[( j ≤ p & p≤ m)⇒^ j ≤ m] first approximation
iff ∀ j∀m[ j ≤ m⇒ ^ j ≤ m] Ackermann’s Lemma
iff ∀ j∀m[ j ≤ m⇒ j ≤ m] adjunction
iff ∀m[m≤ m] J c. join-generates F+
i.e ∀x ∈ X I(0)[x]⊆ R
(0)

[x↓↑] translation
iff ∀x ∈ X I(0)[x]⊆ R
(0)

[x] Lemma 2 since R is I-compatible
iff I ⊆ R. By definition
10.
∀p [p≤ p]
iff ∀p∀ j∀m[( j ≤ p & p≤ m)⇒ j ≤ m] first approximation
iff ∀ j∀m[ j ≤ m⇒ j ≤ m] Ackermann’s Lemma
iff ∀m[m≤ m] J c. join-generates F+
i.e ∀x ∈ X R
(0)

[I(1)[R
(0)

[x↓↑]]]⊆ R
(0)

[x↓↑] translation
iff ∀x ∈ X R
(0)

[I(1)[R
(0)

[x]]]⊆ R
(0)

[x] Lemma 2 since R is I-compatible
iff R;R ⊆ R. By definition
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11.
∀p [^p≤ ^^p]
iff ∀p∀ j∀m[( j ≤ p & ^^p≤ m)⇒^ j ≤ m] first approximation
iff ∀ j∀m[^^ j ≤ m⇒^ j ≤ m] Ackermann’s Lemma
iff ∀ j[^ j ≤ ^^ j] M c. meet-generates F+
i.e ∀a ∈ A R
(0)
^
[I(1)[R
(0)
^
[a↑↓]]]⊆ R
(0)
^
[a↑↓] translation
iff ∀a ∈ A R
(0)
^
[I(0)[R
(0)
^
[a]]]⊆ R
(0)
^
[a] Lemma 2 since R^ is I-compatible
iff R^;R^ ⊆ R^. By definition
12.
∀p [^p≤ p]
iff ∀p∀ j∀m[( j ≤ p & p≤ m)⇒^ j ≤ m] first approximation
iff ∀ j∀m[ j ≤ m⇒ ^ j ≤ m] Ackermann’s Lemma
iff ∀ j∀m[ j ≤ m⇒ j ≤ m] adjunction
iff ∀m[m≤ m] J c. join-generates F+
i.e. ∀x ∈ X I(0)[x]⊆ R
(0)

[I(1)[R
(0)

[x↓↑]]]
iff ∀x ∈ X I(0)[x]⊆ R
(0)

[I(1)[R
(0)

[x]]] Lemma 2 since R is I-compatible
iff I ⊆ R;R. By definition
A.2 Proof of Proposition 6
1.
∀p [p≤ ⊲⊲p]
iff ∀p∀ j∀i[( j ≤ p & i≤ ⊲p)⇒ j ≤ ⊲i] first approximation
iff ∀p∀ j∀i[( j ≤ p & p ≤ ◮i)⇒ j ≤ ⊲i] adjunction
iff ∀ j∀i[ j ≤ ◮i⇒ j ≤ ⊲i] Ackermann’s Lemma
iff ∀i[◮i≤ ⊲i]. J c. join-generates F+
iff ∀a ∈ A R
(0)
◮
[a↑↓]⊆ R
(0)
⊲
[a↑↓] translation
iff ∀a ∈ A R
(0)
◮
[a]⊆ R
(0)
⊲
[a] Lemma 2 since R⊲ is I-compatible
iff R⊲ = R◮. By definition
2.
R⊲ = A×A
iff ∀a∀b[aR⊲b]
iff ∀a∀b[a ∈ R
(0)
⊲
[b]]
iff ∀a∀b[a↑↓ ⊆ R
(0)
⊲
[b↑↓]]
iff ∀i∀ j[i ≤ ⊲ j]
iff
∨
i∈J i≤
∧
j∈I⊲ j
iff
∨
i∈J i≤ ⊲(
∨
j∈I j) ⊲ completely join-reversing
iff ⊤≤ ⊲⊤
3.
49
∀p [p∧⊲p ≤⊥]
iff ∀p∀ j[ j ≤ p∧⊲p⇒ j ≤⊥] first approximation
iff ∀p∀ j[( j ≤ p & j ≤ ⊲p)⇒ j ≤⊥] adjunction
iff ∀ j[ j ≤ ⊲ j⇒ j ≤⊥] Ackermann’s Lemma
iff ∀a ∈ A [a↑↓ ⊆ R
(0)
⊲
[a↑↓] ⇒ a↑↓ ⊆ X↓] translation
iff ∀a ∈ A [a ∈ R
(0)
⊲ [a] ⇒ a ∈ X
↓] Lemma 2 since R⊲ is I-compatible
4.
∀p [⊤≤ ⊲(p∧⊲p)]
iff ∀p∀ j[ j ≤ p∧⊲p⇒⊤≤ ⊲ j] first approximation
iff ∀p∀ j[( j ≤ p & j ≤ ⊲p)⇒⊤≤ ⊲ j] adjunction
iff ∀ j[ j ≤ ⊲ j⇒⊤≤ ⊲ j] Ackermann’s Lemma
iff ∀a ∈ A [a↑↓ ⊆ R
(0)
⊲
[a↑↓] ⇒ A⊆ R
(0)
⊲
[a↑↓]⊆ X↓] translation
iff ∀a ∈ A [a ∈ R
(0)
⊲
[a] ⇒ A⊆ R
(0)
⊲
[a]] Lemma 2 since R⊲ is I-compatible
A.3 Proof of Lemma 10
1.
S ⊆ I
iff ∀x ∈ X [S(0)[x]⊆ I(0)[x]]
iff ∀a ∈ A∀x ∈ X [a ∈ S(0)[x] ⇒ a ∈ I(0)[x]]
iff ∀a ∈ A∀x ∈ X [R
(1)
⊲
[a]⊆ I(0)[x] ⇒ a ∈ I(0)[x]] definition of S
iff ∀a ∈ A∀x ∈ X [R
(1)
⊲
[a↑↓]⊆ I(0)[x] ⇒ a↑↓ ⊆ I(0)[x]] R⊲ I-compatible
iff ∀ j∀m [◮ j ≤ m ⇒ j ≤ m]
iff ∀ j [ j ≤ ◮ j]
iff ∀ j [ j ≤ ⊲ j]
iff ∀a ∈ A [a↑↓ ⊆ R
(0)
⊲
[a↑↓]]
iff ∀a ∈ A [a ∈ R
(0)
⊲
[a]]
iff ∆⊆ R⊲.
2.
R⊲ ◦R⊲ ⊆ R⊲
iff ∀c ∈ A [(R⊲ ◦R⊲)
(0)[c]⊆ R
(0)
⊲
[c]]
iff ∀a∀c ∈ A [a ∈
⋃
b∈R
(0)
⊲
[c]
R
(0)
⊲
[b] ⇒ a ∈ R
(0)
⊲
[c]]
iff ∀a∀b∀c ∈ A [(a ∈ R
(0)
⊲
[b] & b ∈ R
(0)
⊲
[c]) ⇒ a ∈ R
(0)
⊲
[c]]
iff ∀a∀b∀c ∈ A [(a↑↓ ⊆ R
(0)
⊲
[b↑↓] & b↑↓ ⊆ R
(0)
⊲
[c↑↓]) ⇒ a↑↓ ⊆ R
(0)
⊲
[c↑↓]]
iff ∀i∀ j∀k [(i≤ ⊲ j & j ≤ ⊲k) ⇒ i≤ ⊲k]
iff ∀i∀ j [i≤ ⊲ j ⇒ ∀k( j ≤ ⊲k ⇒ i≤ ⊲k)]
iff ∀i∀ j [i≤ ⊲ j ⇒ ∀k(k ≤ ◮ j ⇒ k ≤ ◮i)]
iff ∀i∀ j [i≤ ⊲ j ⇒ ◮ j ≤ ◮i]
iff ∀i∀ j [i≤ ⊲ j ⇒ i≤ ⊲◮ j]
iff ∀ j [⊲ j ≤ ⊲◮ j].
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S⊆ S ; S
iff ∀x ∈ X [S(0)[x]⊆ S(0)[I(1)[S(0)[x]]]]
iff ∀a ∈ A∀x ∈ X [a ∈ S(0)[x] ⇒ a ∈ S(0)[I(1)[S(0)[x]]]]
iff ∀a ∈ A∀x ∈ X [R
(1)
⊲
[a]⊆ I(0)[x] ⇒ R
(1)
⊲
[a]⊆ I(0)[I(1)[S(0)[x]]]] definition of S
iff ∀a ∈ A∀x ∈ X [R
(1)
⊲
[a]⊆ I(0)[x] ⇒ R
(1)
⊲
[a]⊆ S(0)[x]] S(0)[x] Galois-stable
iff ∀a ∈ A∀x ∈ X [R
(1)
⊲
[a]⊆ I(0)[x] ⇒ ∀b(b ∈ R
(1)
⊲
[a] ⇒ b ∈ S(0)[x])]
iff ∀a ∈ A∀x ∈ X [R
(1)
⊲
[a]⊆ I(0)[x] ⇒ ∀b(b ∈ R
(1)
⊲
[a] ⇒ R
(1)
⊲
[b]⊆ I(0)[x])]
iff ∀a ∈ A∀x ∈ X [R
(1)
⊲
[a↑↓]⊆ I(0)[x] ⇒ ∀b(b↑↓ ⊆ R
(1)
⊲
[a↑↓] ⇒ R
(1)
⊲
[b↑↓]⊆ I(0)[x])] R⊲ I-compatible
iff ∀i∀m [◮i≤ m ⇒∀ j( j ≤ ◮i ⇒ ◮ j ≤ m)]
iff ∀i∀ j∀m [(◮i≤ m & j ≤ ◮i) ⇒ ◮ j ≤ m]
iff ∀i∀ j [ j ≤ ◮i ⇒ ∀m(◮i≤ m ⇒ ◮ j ≤ m)]
iff ∀i∀ j [ j ≤ ◮i ⇒ ◮ j ≤ ◮i]
iff ∀i∀ j [i≤ ⊲ j ⇒ i≤ ⊲◮ j]
iff ∀ j [⊲ j ≤ ⊲◮ j].
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